Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1971

Couch v. United States
Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers, Box 379/Folder 17-19

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

.,

.

- -~(>

Court

-

CA - 4

-1-rtr-

Voted on .. .. ... ... ........ , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 . . .

No. 71-889

LILLIAN V. COUCH, Petitioner

vs.

UNITED STATES AND EDWARD F. JENNINGS, ETC.

1/10/72 Cert. filed.

~
iw:fa+,/.e-._,,

-

~~~

U>-L~

~ ....-<, tl. .u►

HOLD
FOR

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMENT

CERT.
G

D

• • • •I• • • •

Blackmun, J . ............,.... .
Marshall, J . .............,.... .

•

White, J ............. .. . .,.... .
Stewart, J . .............. ,.... .
Brennan, J.. ............., .... .

I, • • •

POST

DIS

AFF

REV

AFF

MOTION
G

D

AB-

INOT_

SENT : ~ :

•I • • • •

../

Rehnquist, J .... .. ....... ,.... .
Powell, J ... .......... .. .,.... .

N

MERITS

o,..J , ,,... _,.o.

✓

....

····;··
✓.t ....
. ...

........ ..
l~

.·✓··
.. . . .

1.11,::::

Douglas, J . ..............,.... .

• • • 1.

Burger, Ch. J . ...........,.... .

•••

◄

•

✓

.1

....
I••••

• • • •I • • • • I• • • • •I• • • •

◄

••••••••••

3/21/72

CEP

\?

ell...l;f.

~y

f'_,_1-y/~-~~~~

~~>~

'

~ ~ ~ ~~~/ ~ ~
-

~

I /t)

Sfe-•44-e a__,+-

,to ~

~ ~ f . ...J.. ~ -,'•~""'-'.
P....c-rv-. ~ 'f-~ ~ s ~a ◄ •.., ◄ ~.

c:~~~'1--S;G-.~~
.
.
~J-c...l,~~~....

~ ~ ~ ,,. .. ...,,rt() ~ , _ ~ ~
~

·~

•~
~z
@N
~-

t( V..,,•

~...~ ~ ~

¥-

~

,,

~ ~ l w A . ''.

~

~ a... ~ ~
No. 71-889 OT 1971

A

~ t"k.J. ~ ~.-1(,,,U

Couch y. United S t a t e s l

-

4-A.A..

·

I-

dt.,lfl~ .

.../----

D\SCU1

Cert to CA 4 (Haynesworth, Bryan & Butzner)(PC)

The government brought this suit to enforce an IRS summons
requiring petr's bookkeeper to appear before an IRS special
agent to testify and to produce for examination all of petr's
books, records, and papers in his possession.

The USDC ordered

compliance with the summons, and the CA 4 affirmed per curiam.
Petr argues that the records are within the scope of
the protection afforded by her 5th amendment privilege against
self~incrimination and her 4th amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

•

CA 4 held that - the

-

privilege against self-incrimination did not apply, because

-

petr had not been ordered to produce evidence or testify.

1

petr voluntarily relinquished control of the records, CA 4

reasoned that they passed from the sphere of the privilege.

Once

)I

•

•

In other words, a party is privileged from producing evidence,
but not from its production,
CA 4 did not address the 4th amendment claim.
event, the same possession analysis applies.

In any

The SG argues

that this Court has never held that a subpoena directed at a
~

tm.rd party who possesses papers for a proper use raises 4th
•
amendment rights on behalf of a person whg cJairni iQlll.Q kind

•

A

of ultimate ownership of the papers.
Petr also contends that the issuance of the summons was
improper because the statute authorizes issuance only in civil
suits, and that bringing in a Special Agent indicated that
the investigation had changed from civil to criminal in character.
The lower courts found that the investigation was at least
partly directed toward ascertaining the proper tax liability,

•

and therefore retained a civil character,
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Covert E. Parnell, III

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE : March 25, 1972

No. 71-889 Couch v. U. S.
This is the case you and I discussed concerning the "IRS
summons''.
At the Conference, I was the only Justice who urged a "grant"
and three others joined me.
But even these three were not very firm, and it was suggested

•-

that the case be relisted for more careful study.
Several Justices said that prior decisions of this Court pretty
well controlled the case. Donaldson v. U. S. , 40:0 U. S. 517 was
mentioned.

Bill Brennan mentioned Shapiro - without giving any

citation.
In any event, I would appreciate your taking another look at

this and help me focus more sharply on the issues and any relevant
prior decisions. We can talk about this on Thursday.
L. F. P. , Jr.
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,ju:pnuu ar~urt llf tfr.t ~.tb' ,jtattg
JlasJrm:ghm. ,. QI. 21Tffe'!$
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

December 7, 1972
71-889 - Couch v. U. S.
Dear Lewis,
l am in basic agreement with your opinion in this

case, but I have two reservations, both of which are to me important:
(1) At several points the opinion speaks of the "privilege against self-incrimination. " In my view there is no such
privilege. What the Constitution confers is a privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination. I would hope that the word
"compulsory" can be inserted in every instance where the phrase
is used.
(2) Such coerced confession cases as Chambers v..
Florida and Blackburn v. Alabama, cited and quoted from in the
opinion, were not decided under the Compulsory Self-incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I think the distinction is
a very real one, and I would hope that the opinion's reliance upon
these State coerced· confession cases could be eliminated.
Sincerely yours,

1/

() ~ '
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
the Law Clerks

r
~

-

/

j\u:.prttttt (lt~ cf tlrt ~ h j\taftg

11JasJrhtghm. ~- (lt. 2ll,;i'1.;l
CH AMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

December

Re:

No.

11, 1972

71 - 889 - Couch v. U.S.

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference

-

~upt"mtt <!Jcud cf flrt ~t~ ~htttg

~agfr:nghm. ~. QJ. 211.;iJ!.,
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

December 11, 1972

Re: 71-889, Couch v. United States and Jennings
Dear Lewis,
I am glad to join your opinion for
the Court as recirculated December 8.
Sincerely yours,

0'5,

1/
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference

/
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2.llffe~,

C H A MBER S O F

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

December 11, 1972

Re:

No. 71-889 - Couch v. United States

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.

sincerely ~

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.e

.hµutttt <!}ltttrl itf tir~ 1lnittb ~mug
Jbtlllrhtgttttt. J. (!}. 211.;i'!,
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

December 11, 1972

Re:

No. 71-889

-

Couch v. U.S. and Jennings

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~
Mr. Justice Powell

cc:

The Conference

/

-

~u.prniu

(!}tntrl ttf tqt ~ t h j;tattg

JJasqingfon:, 16.

QJ.

2llffeJ.1.~

CHAMBERS OF

JusT1cE wM . J . sRENNAN , JR.

December 13, 1972

RE: No. 71-889 Couch v. United States
Dear Lewis :
I voted the other way at conference and
while I think you've written a persuasive
opinion, I hope you'll bear with me a while
until I've had a chance finally to make up my
mind.
Sincerely,

£;}
Mr. Justice Powell
cc : The Conference

/)

~

Re: No. 71-889 Couch v. United states

Of course, take as long as you wish.

"credit" with me. Remember Pipefitters?
Sincerely,

Mr.

lfp/ss

Memo to: Jay Wilkinson
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

December 29, 1972

Nt:>. 71-889 Couch v. U. S.
In talking to Bill Brennan, he thinks it would be a good idea for

us to add a footnote responding to Thurgood Marshall's dissent.
Bill agrees completely that the dissent is not a fair one, and misconstrues significantly our opinion. While he may have more reason than
we do for this view, I would appreciate your reproducing the substance
of the note you prepared earlier this week - so that we can take another
look at this.
Please don't interrupt working on the opinion, as this is top priority except for doing the cert notes on time.
If we can add a footnote and recirculate Couch on Monday, this will
be in good time .
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~u:pi-tmt QJcurt cf tJrt ~nittlt ~iatts
J}'MJrmgtcn. ~. QJ. 2.llffeJ!.'
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

January 3, 1973

Re:

71-889 - Couch v. U. S.

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Regards,

UJ~
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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No. 71-889
COUCH v. U.S.
....,...-r
Vk.. ~

Cd.-4...L-

The petitionerAoperated a restaurai t · Roanoke, Virginia.
For many years, going back to 1955, she ad given her business

He- t~- ~-- ~~~ ~

s)

records to her accountant_ who prepa l!ed p@t-it:iGnSI '" returns.
A

"\

In 1969, the Internal Revenue Service commenced an
~,;z___.

investigation of ~eHtienHtls tax returns.
A

Suspecting a possible

criminal violation, the IRS sought to see petitioner's records/in
the possession of her accountant.

When permission was refused,

a summons was directed to the accountan0 o produce the records.
'Fhef{etitioner, relying upon the Fifth Amendment privilege

against compulsory self incrimination, claims that the IRS has
t,-u,.1-

no
right to the records.
__,. . - -

~ S. ) -

It is clear} underA prior decisions /

that the privilege would protect petitioner f

the compulsory process were directed against her.

summons was against the accountaf

But here the

ho customarily retained

these records.
The Fifth Amendment privilege is a personal one; it adheres
J

~

to the person/ and not to-'\information which may incriminate.

~

"I

Jh_

r

The

~4,~

.

•·

2.
essence of the protectiof au,mled is to prevent personal compulsion/
@.f

self incrimination.

personal intrusion.
privacr

Here, we find no such compulsionf nd no

TNor was there any lagitimate expectation of

ith respect to records left for many yeai

in the hands

of a person whose duty it was} o prepare petitioner's tax returns
in accordance with la~ .J

For these reasons, and on these facts, we sustain the
validity of the government's summons, and affirm the judgment
of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a concurring opinion.
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall have filed
dissenting opinions.

•

THE C. J.

.
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No. 71-889 COUCH v. U.S.
On January 7, 1970, the government filed a petition in

the iUnited States District Court for the Western District of
-1

Pennsylvania, pursuant to 26 U. S. C. 7402(b) and 9604(a) seeking
enforcement of an internal revenue summons in coonection with
an investigation of petitioner's tax liability from 1964-1968. The
summons was directed to petitioner's accO\Dltant for the production of:
"All books, records, bank statements, cancelled
checks, deposit ticket copies, workpapers and
all other pertinent documents pertaining to the
tax liability of the above taxpayer. n2
The principal question is whether the taxpayer may"invoke
her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to prevent
the production of her business and tax records in the possession
3
of her accountant.

Both the district court and court of appeals
4

for the Fourth Circuit, held the privilege unavailable. We granted
certiorari,

U. S. (

).

'

.
- 2-

Petitioner is the sole 11D proprietress of a ZiiBDK
restaurant. Since 19 55 she had given bank statements, payroll
records, and reports of sales and expenditures to her accountant,
Harold Shaffer, for the purpose of preparing her income tax returns.
The' accountant was not petitioner's personal employee but an
independent contractor who maintained his own office and retained
111merous other clients whc•

cw■ e

compensated him cm a piecework

basis. When petitioner surrendered possession of the records

to Shaffer, she, of course, retained title in herself.
During the summer of 1969, Internal Il&tiK Revenue Agent
Dennis Groves commenced an investigation of petitimer's tax
returns. After examining her books and records in Shaffer's office
with his permission, Groves found indications of a substantial
understatement of gross income. Groves thereupon reported the
case to the Intelligence Divi9 ion of the Internal Revenue Service.

Special Agent Jennings of the Intelligence Division next
commenced a joint investigation with flax Groves to determine

,\

.
- 3 -

petitioner's correct tax liability, the possibility of income tax
fraud and the imposition of tax fraud penalties, and, lastly, the
possibility of a

◄

tt)tO'l•-lf.,

recommendation of a z criminal tax

I

violation. Jennings first introduced himself to petitioner, gave
her Mi_!anda wamings as required by IRS directive, and then
I

!

'

5
issued the summons to Shaffer after the latter refused to let him

see, remove, or microfilm petitioner's records.

When Jennings arrived at Shaffer's office on September 2,
1969, the return day of the summons, to view the records, he
found that Shaffer, at petitioner's request, had surrendered the
documents to petitioner's attomey. Jennings thereupon petitioned
in district court for enforcement of the summons, and petitioner
intervened, asserting that the ownership of the records warranted
6

a Fifth Amendment privilege to bar their production.

\

- 4 -

I

It is now undisputed that• a special agent can, pursuant
to 26 U. S. C. 7602, issue an internal revenue summons in aid of
7

a tax investigation with possible civil and criminal cmsequences.
In Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.

s.

517 (1971), the Court

uph~ld such a summons, noting that:
"Congress clearly has authorized the use of the
summons in investigating what may prove to be
criminal conduct • . • . There is no statutory
suggestions for any meaningful line of distinction,
for civil as compared with criminal purposes, at
the point of a special agent's appearance•••.
To draw a line where a special agent appears would
require the Service, in a situation of suspected but
undetermined fraud, to forgo either the use of the
summons or the potentiality of an ultimate recommendation for prosecution. We refuse to draw that
line and thus to stultify enforcement of federal law."
400 U. s. at 53 5-6~
The Court in Donaldson noted that the taxpayer there had
intervened to bar production of records "in which the taxpayer liad
no proprietary interest of any kind, which are owned by the third
person, which are in his hands, and which relate to the third
person's business transactions with the taxpayer. " 400 U.

s.

523. : The Court quite properly cmcluded that, under these facts,

-5-

no absolute right to intervene existed. 400 U.S. at 530-1. 'Ib.e
instant case, however, presents a closer question. Here petitioner does own the business records which the government seeks
to review and the courts below did permit her to intervene. 'Ib.e
essential inquiry is whether her proprietary interest further
enables her to assert successfully her privilege against selfincrimination to bar enforcement of the summons and production
of the records, despite the fact that the records no longer remained in her possession.

'

,..'
- 6 -

n
~/
,I'

The privilege against self-incrimination has been a
cherished and durable m value in our system of justice. It is
sensitive and vulnerable to the zeal of the prosecution, and this
Court has often been summoned to defend it. Counselman v.
v. Hitchcock, 142 U. s. 547 (1892); Chambers v. Florida, 309
U. s. 227 (1940); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384

u. s.

4SI ( 1966). By its very nature, the

privilege is an intimate and '811[ perscmal one. . It respects a
private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought and proscribes
state intrusion to extract self-condemnation. Historically, the
privilege sprang from an abhorrence of protracted governmental
assault against the single individual accused of crime and the
suspicion of temptations to the state to use the cruel, single
expedient of compelling incriminating evidence from .lllidtl one's
own mouth.

Miranda, supra, at 460; United states v. White, 322

U.S. 694, 698 (1944); Chambers, supra, at 235-8. The Court has

'/

...
- 7 -

thought the privilege necessary to prevent any "recurrence of
the Inquisition and the star Chamber, even if not in their stark
brutality," Ullman v. United states, 350 U. s. 422, 428 (1956)
and it has recognized that "coercion can be mental as well as
physical, and that the blood of an accused is not the only hallmark

of an unconstitutional inquisition." Blackburn v. Alabama, 361

u. s.

199, 206 (1960).
In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55

(1964) the Court articulated the policies and purposes of the
privilege against self-incrimination:

"* * * our unwillingness to subject those suspected
of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial
rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice;
our fear that self-incriminating statements will be
elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense
of fair play which dictates 'a fair state-individual
balance by requiring the government * * * in its
ccmtest with the individual to shoulder the entire
load, ' * * *; our respect for the inviolability of the
human perscmality and of the right of each individual
'to a private enclave where he may lead a private
life, ' * * * I'.
It is important to reiterate that the Fifth Amendment privilege

is a personal privilege:

it adheres basically to the person, not

t

....

- 8 -

to information
which may incriminate him. ~ As Mr.
,,
Holmes

Justictt''lld&B put it: "A party is privileged from producing the

evidence but not from its production. " Johnson v. United &'tates,
228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913). The Constitution explicitly prohibits
compelling an accused to bear witness "against himself": it
necessarily did not proscribe incriminating statements elicited
from another. Compulsion upon the persm asserting it is an
important element of the privilege, and "prohibition of compelling
a man •.• to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communcation from
him," Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-3 (1910) {emphasis
~

added). It is extortion of information from the accused himself

that offends our sense of justice and caused, for example, the
Court in Chambers, supra, at 238-9 to condemn the protracted
questioning and cross-questioning ott ignorant young tenant farmers
by state officers "in a fourth :fimt floor jail room, where as

prisoners they were without friends, advisors or counselors,

,.I

,

.
- 9 -

and under circumstances calculated to break the strongest nerves
and the stoutest resistance. " Likewise in Malloy, supra, at 7-8,
the coocem over inquisitional coercion of an accused motivated
the Court's incorporation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
the states.
Here this important ingredient of personal compulsion
against

an accused is lacking. The summoos and the order of

the district court enforcing it are directed solely against the
9

accountant.

He, not the taxpayer, is the ooly one compelled to

do anything. And the accountant makes no claim that he niay
tend to be incriminated by the production. Inquisitorial pressure
or coercion against a potentially accused person, compelling
her, against her will, to utter self-condemning words or produce
incriminating aiw ■■ M documents is absent from this case. In
the present case, ''no shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or
enforced communication by the accused" is involved. Schmerber
v. California, 384 U. s. 757, 765 (1966).

'

"'

- 10 The divulgence of potentially incriminating evidence against
petitioner or any other accused of crime ts bound to be a disquieting
and uncomfortable experience. But petitioner's distress would
seem substantially unaffected by whether the divulgence came from

her accountant or:im from any other third party with whonm
she was connected and who mdl possesse<;t substantial lmowledge
of her business affairs.

N:or would her ownership of the business

records seem to ccm.tribute significantly to her discomfort. That
discomfort in this case stems essentially from the f11.ct of divulgence
of the possibly incriminating information, not from the manner

in which or the person from whom it was extracted. Yet such
divulgence, where it did not coerce the accused herself~ ts
obviously a necessary and important part· of the process of law
enforcement and tax investigation.
Petitioner's reliance on Boyd v. United states, 116 U. s.
616 tis x.- '"4wJ■d!i misplaced. In Boyd, the perscm. asserting the

~

~•

~

j.

N
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privilege was· in possession of the written statements in question.
The Court in Boyd did hold that "any forcible and compulsory
extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to
be used as evidence to ccmvict him of crime," 116 U. s. 630,

violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. That case did not,
however, address or ccmtemplate the divergence of ownership

10
and possession, . and petlticmer concedes that court decision
applying Boyd have largely been in instances where possession
11
and ownership ccmjolned,

see ~- _g. Hill v. Philpott, 445 F. 2d

144 (7th Cir. 1971); U.S. v. Judscm, 63-2 USTC 9658 (9th Cir.
-12
1963).
In Boyd, the production nib order was directed against

the owner of the property who, by responding, would have been
forced "to produce and authenticate any perscmal documents or
effects that might incriminate him." United states v. White,

supra, at 698. But again we reiterate that in the instant case
there was no enforced c ommuniction by any accused or potential

accused.

•

'l' ·, ..

'
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Petitioner would, in effect, have us read Boyd to mark

13
ownership, not possession, as the bOIDlds of the privilege,
despite the fact that possession bears the more c mcrete relationship
to the persmal compulsions forbidden by the Fifth Amendment.
To tie the privilege against self-incrimination to a cmcept of
ownership wruld be to draw a meaningless line. It would hold
here that the business records which petitioner actually owned
in the hands of her ace ountant would be protected, while business
information communicated to her accountant by letter, conversatioos
in which the accountant took notes, in addition to the accountant's
workpapers and even photocopies of petitioner's records would
not be subject to a claim of privilege since title rested in the
accountant. Such a holding would thus place unnecessary stress
and emphasis on the form of communicatinn to an accountant and
the accountant's own working methods, while simultaneously diverting
the inquiry from the basic purposes of the Fifth Amendment's
protections.

•

- 13 -

Petitioner also alleges that "if the

ms is able to reach ill

her, records the instant those records leave her bands and are
dep~ited in the hands of her retainer whom she has hired for a
14

special purpose then the meaning of the privilege is lost. "
At oral argument petitioner raised a similar cmcern:
''The government goes so far to contend, I believe,
with their ..tl)eory that any tiµie it is out of your
~ctual:.physica.Lp_9.ssesslcm,, ,'t t is subject to
subpoena . • : . If I \vere helping you across
Constit~ionia .Ayenu~ by carrying your briefcase,
the Government :holds that they could hand me a
summons in the •middle of Constitution. Avenue and
seize your documen_ts: to use against you in a
criminal trial~, n15
That is not, however, the import of today's decision. We
do 1111 Indeed believe that actual possession bears a very important
relationship to Fifth Amendment protections against state compulaimis
upon the individual accused of crime~ Yet situations may well
arise where the relinquishment of posses~ion is so temporary and
insignificant as to leave the personal compulsions upon the accused
16
substantially Intact.

But this is not at all the case here. Here

there was no mere monetary divertment of possession: it seems
the records had been given to this accountant since 1955 and remained

.
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in his continuous possession until the summer of 1968 when the

17
summons was ,issued.

Many of the records had thus been in

the accountant's. possession 1for twelve or thirteen year~. Moreover,

I'

the' accountant himself neither worked 1n petitioner's office m nor
employ.

18

.
His status ls that of an independent contractor. He

19
actually did "very little work for the petitioner," had many other
clients, and was compensated by the job. The length of his
possession of petitioner's records and his independent status
confirm the belief that petitioner's divestment of possession was
of such a character as to remove her as an object of any impermissible
Fifth Amendment compulsion.

-'
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Finally, petitioner notes that the. complexity of tax
forms and income reporting require individuals to seek assistance
in completing tax returns. From ~is, she argues that ''the
increased complexity of government should not be used as an
forfeit
excuse whereby individuals are compell,e d to l111f1!t basic
rights'' (Brief p. 21).

The point apparently is that those who

seek outside expertise are penalized while those 1daql who
prepare returns themselves are protected. To avoid such
µ..r,

penalties, petitioner urges the protection of the c~tant-client
relationship with constitutional safeguards.
We decline, however, to regard those who seek professional
assistance in preparing tax returns as a disfavored class somehow
,meriting a rending of Fifth Amendment protections from their
historic base. The advantages of professional assistance are
numerous and obvious, and we doubt that anyone will be significantly
deterred from seeking them by anything in the present decision!
No such confidential accountant-client privilege exists under
federal law today, and no state-created privilege has been recog-

-16nized in purely federal cases, Falsone v. United States , 205
WF. 2d 734 (5 Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864; Gariepy ,v.

~)

-~
M

United States , 189 F. 2d 159-463-4 (6 Cirf. ); Himmelfarb v. United
Sta.es, 175 F.2d 924, 939 (9Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860;
Olender v. United States , 210 F. 2d,795·, 806 (9 Cir.) •.• _Nor,is
there justification for ·such a privilege where ,r.ecords relevant
to income tax returns are involved. In Boyd, a. pre+income tax
case, the Court spoke of protection of privacy, 116 U. s. at 630,
but· there can be little expectation of privacy where records are
handed to an accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of
much of the information therein.is required in. an income tax return. What information is not disclosed is largely in account~t's
discretion, not petitioner's. The accountant himself risks criminal
prosecution if he knowingly assists in the preparation of a false
return, 26 U. s. C. 7602(2). His own need for self-protection would
often require the right to disclose the information given.him. The
irony is that petitioner seeks extensions of constitutional protection
against self-incrimination in the very situation where obligations
of disclosure clearly exist and under a system which depends for
honest self-reporting even to survive. Accordingly, petitioner

,,,

•
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here cannot reasonably claim, either for Fourth

20

or Fifth

Amendment purposes, an expectation of protected privacy or
confidentiality.
Several precedents debated by the parties lend support
to our decision. In Johnson v. United states, supra, the Court
held that the books and records of a bankrupt transferred to
a µ-ustee in bankruptcy could be used as evidence agains,t the
bankrupt· in a prosecution for concealing money from the trustee.
'

"

.,

Unlike thtt'" instant case, both title and possession passed in that
transfer and the records were, in one sense, "published" by it.
But the Court, in denying the privilege, recognized that the transfer also succeeded in removing the important element of personal
compulsion against the accused, 4228 U.s. 459, just as, in this
'

.

case, the nature of the divestment of possession did.

21

In Perlman v. United States, 247 U.s. 7 _ . (1918) the

Court held the privilege unavailable to a party seeking to suppress
the admission of incriminating documents and exhibits before a
grand jury. The movant' s expectations of privacy in the exhibits
had, according to the Court, been destroyed when he voluntarily

"

-18-

surrendered the exhibits as evidence in a patent infringement
case he had earlier brought in federal district court. Petitioner's
claims of ownership failed to overcome this fact. The Court
noted pertinently:
"But Perlman insists that he owned the exhibits and appears to contend that his ownership exempted them from any use by the ·
Government without his consent. The extent
of the insistence is rather elusive of measurement. It seetns to be that the owner of property must be consi.d ered as having a constructive possession of it wherever it be and,in
whosesoever hands it be, and it is always,
therefore, in a kind of asylum of constitutional
privilege. And to be of avail the contention
must be pushed to this extreme. It is opposed,
however, by all the cited cases. They, as we
have said, make the criterion of immunity .
not the ownership of property but the ''physical
or moral.compulsion" exerted." 247 U.S. 15.
The "criterion of immubity" remains not the ownership
of property, but ~e "physic_a l or moral compulsion exerted."
We hold today that no Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimJnation nor any hybrid Fourth or Fifth Amendment claim
can p~evail where, as in this case, there exists no legitimate expectation of privacy and no semblance of governmental compulsion
against the person of the accused. It is important, ·in applying
constitutional principles, to inte~ret µi.em in,light of the impo!tant

~

~-19mlm
and fundamental interests of personal liberty they were ·meant
to serve. Respect for these principles is lessened and eroded
when they leap their proper bounds to interfere with the legitimate interest of society in enforceme,Jit of its laws and collectlon
of the revenues. 'Ibis we refuse to countenance today.
The judgment of the B>urt of

tau - hills
Affirmed.

.

...

FOOTNOTES

1.

I

~- Appendix pp. 59-60.
3. The district court held that "since at the time the
summons was served, the taspayer, Lillian Y. Couch, was not
in possession of the books, records and documents described in

the summons, she may not assert any Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination as a bar to the enforcement of the
summons. " Appendix pp. 6, 11. The opinion of the district
court (WD Va.) is not reported.

.

, .- :..- · ...;,

- 2 -

4. The Court of Appeals also noted that 1111 the answer to
petitioner's Fifth Amendment contentions lay in the fact that
''the records were not in the intervenor's [taxpayer's] possession
but were tn the custody ofildrher accountant," 449 F. 2d 141,
I. The summoos, which is printed in full in Appendix
pp. 59-60, was issued on August 18,. 1969, pursuant to 26
U.

s. C.

7602, which provides

4 ,

-

,

· •
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6. We note that petitioner also claimed that enforcement
of the summons would violate her Fourth Amendment right to
be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.

We agree

with the government, however, that ''this claim is not further
articulated and does not appear to be independent of her Fifth
Amendment argument. " Govt. Brief pp. 21-22.
7. There is clearly the joint ac civil and possibly criminal
investigatory purpose in the instant case, see p.

__J

supra.

8. Donaldson, cautioned only that the summons be issued
in good faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution.
400 U. s. at 536. Neither of those conditions is challenged here.

••
~

9. Technically the order to produce the records was directed
to petitioner's attorney since, after the 1E summons was served
upon the ace ountant, he ignored it and surrendered the records
to the attorney. But constitutional rights obviously cannot be

I

enlarged by this kind of actioo. The rights and obligations of the

r

parties became fixed when the summons was served, and the
transfer did not alter them. See United statesm:x v. Zakutansky,
401 F. 2d 68, 72 ( 7th Cir. ), C?.ert. denied, . 393 U. S. 1021; United
stat~_!_ v. Lyons, 442 F. 2d 1144 (1st Cir. )
10. A later Court commenting on the Boyd privilege noted
that "the papers and effects which the privilege protects must be
the private property of the person claiming the privilege or at
least

~

his pa possession in a purely persmal capacity. "

United states v. White, 322 U. s. 694, 699 (1944). (emphasis added).
11. Petitioner's Brief pp. 13-14.

I

~

•

12. See also United states v. Cohen, 388 F. 2d 464, 468
Ax:111 (1967) where the court, In upholding the right of a possessor,

m w non-owner to assert the privilege, noted that "it is
possession of papers sought by the government, not ownership,
which ~ets the stage for exercise of the governmental compulsion
which it is the purpose of the privilege to prohibit. " Though the
tatx Instant case concerns the scope of the privilege for an owner,

non-possessor, the Ninth Circuit's linkage of possession to the
purposes served by the privilege was well-placed.

.

13. Petitioner's Brief, pp. 11-17.
14. Id. p 13.
15. Tr. of Oral Arg. p. 14.
16. Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F. 2d 855 (8th Cir.
1956) involved an attorney's partially successful motion to quash
two subpoenas duces tecum issued in a grand jµry proceeding
against a corporation where the attomey had stored his office files.
Unit~d States

v. Buterma,

.272 F. 2d 344 (2nd Cir. 1959) concerned

the storage of taxpay~r's personal records iKJDC in a safe in offices
of a c_orporation which the taxpayer had served as Chairman of the
Board. Only the taxpayer and an indicted co-defendant knew the
combination of the safe, and the corporation had no access to it.
The court of appeals upheld the taxpayer's assertion of Fifth
Amendment privilege as to his personal records in the face of a
grand jury subpoena directed to the corpcration.
Petitioner argues these cases support his position (Brief
pp. 14-15); the Govemment argues the third party "possession"

can be distinguished from the instant case case as involving mere
custodial safekeeping of records, not disclosure of their information
to a third person (Brief, p. 21). We refrain from judging the merits
of such distinction today.

17. Tr. of Oral Argument, p. 31.
18. This is a significant point. The Govemment noted in
oral argument that:
"In the Internal Revenue Service practice, so long
as the taxpayer has retained possession· of the records
and they are being 11sed only by his full-time employees
or others on the taxpayer's premises, without the
taxpayer having relinquished_possession or control
of the.records, we ordinarily in those sltuatioos issue
the summons to the taxpayer, because it is the taxpayer
who has the dominion over the records and the authority
to return the summons. And if the taxpayer chooses
to plead the privilege against self-incrimination, that
is up to t~e taxpayer. " Tr. . of Oral ArgunE nt, p. 30.
See also Tr. of Oral Argument p. 36 when the Govemment
concedes it ''would be a much more difficult case" where a taxpayer's

employee, who worked in the taxpayer's office all day and
happened to take the records home at night or .on weekends would
be subject to subpoena.

.

..

19 .. Tr. of Oral-Argument_p. 8.

~cot.Wl!IJ3 18

,:.? fJ,

We reiterate our belief, expressed•in note 6, supra, that
Petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim is neither deeply articulated
or pressed independently from the Fifth Amendment contentions.
At any rate, the summons satisfied the requirements in United
States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-8 and, as explained above, the
necessary expectation of privacy to launch a valid Fourth Amendment
claim does not exist. Katz v. United States_, 389 U.S. 347.

21. _Burdeau v. McDowell , 256 U. s. 465 (1921), also debated and cited
in the briefs, held that the government may retain for use against
their owner in a criminal proceeding incriminating documents which
were stolen by private individuals, without any government knowledge
or complicity, and turned over to the government. The Court, in
denying the owner's privilege, alluded primarily to the absence of
any governmental compulsion against the accused, the precise factor
considered in the instant case. It is true, as petitioners argue, that
the case turns somewhat on a discuss~on of governmental versus
private compulsion and invasion, but it is equally true that the Court
in Bti.rdeau faile~ to find anyma impermissible compulsion on the
owner in his absence of possession:

~~

continuation· of Footnote 21:
,,

We know of no constitutional principle wtich
requires the Government to surrender the
papers

J11m

under such circumstances. Had

it learned that such incriminatory papers,
tending to show a violation of federal law,
were in the hands of a person other than the
accused, it having had no part in wrongfully
obtaining them, we know of no reason why a
subpoena might not issue for the production
of the papers as evidence. Such production
would require no unreasonable search and
seizure, nor would it amount to compelling
fl

the accused to testify against himself. 256 ·u. S.
at 476.

..
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COUCH v. UNITED STATES et al.
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
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, 1973
Petitioner challenges an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) summons directing
an accountant, an independent contractor with numerous clients, to
produce business records that she had been giving to him for preparation of her tax returns from 1955 to 1968, when the summons was issued.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that the privilege
against self-incrimination asserted by petitioner was not available.
Held:

On the facts of this case, wher~
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there was no personal compulsion against petitioner to produce

the records., a1tl!I The Fifth Amendmen~

no bar to their pro-

duction by the accountant, even though the IRS tax investigation may
entail possible criminal as well as civil consequences. Nor does
WttA----

petitioner, who -i.il aware that much of the information in the records
must be disclosed in her tax returns, have any legitimate expectation
of privacy that would bar production under either the Fourth or Fifth
Amendment. Pp. 5-14.
449 F. 2d 141, affirmed.

NOTE: Where It ls deemed desirable, a syllabus (headnote) wlll

be released, as Is being done in connection with this case, at the time

the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for
the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber
Oo., 200 U.S. 321, 337.
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THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 71-889. Argued Nowmber 14, 1972-Decided January 9, 1973'
Petitioner challenges an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) summons
directing an accountant, an independent contractor with numerous
clients, to produce business records that she had been giYing to
him for preparation of her tax returns from 1955 to 1968, when
the summons was issued. The District Court and the Court of
Appeals concluded that the privilege against self-incrimination
asserted by petitioner was not available. Held: On the facts
of this case, where petitioner had effectively surrendered possession of the records to the accountant, there was no personal com-pulsion against petitioner to produce the records. The Fifth
Amendment therefore constitutes no bar to their production by
the accountant, even though the IRS tax investigation may entail
possible criminal as well as civil consequences. Nor does petitioner, who was aware that much of the information in therecords had to be disclosed in her tax returns, have any legitimate
e;,qJectation of prirncy that would bar production under either
the Fourth or Fifth Amendment. Pp. 5-14.
449 F. 2d 141, affirmed.
PowELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,.
C. J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, "\VHrrE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a concurring opinion. DouGLAS and MARSHALL, JJ. , filed dissenting opinions.

NOTICE: Thi• opinion Is subject to formnl revision before publlcattoll
In the prelimlnury print of the Unlt('d Statl'S Reports. Renders are requested to notify tbe Reporter uf D~cislons, Supreme Court of tbt
United Stutes, Wnshington. D.C. 20:i4:{ , of any typographical or otl1er
tormul errors, In order that correctlons may be made before the pro•
liminury print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 71-889
Lillian V. Couch, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the·
United States Court of
v.
Appeals for the Fourth
United States and Edward
Circuit.
F. Jennings, Etc.
[January 9, 1973]
MR. JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
On January 7, 1970, the Government filed a petition
in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, pursuant to 26 U. S. C. §§ 7402 (b)
and 7604 (a) ,1 seeking enforcement of an Internal Revenue summons in connection with an investigation of
petitioner's tax liability from 1964-1968. The summons
1

SEC. 7402.

JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS.

"(b) To Enforce Summons.-If any person is summoned under
the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books,
papers, or other data , the district court of the United States for the
district in which such person resides or may be found shall have
jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attend:mce, testimony, or production of books, papers, or other data.
"SEC. 7604. ENFORCEMENT OF Sm,1:MoNs.
"(a) Jurisdiction of District Court.-If any person is summoned
under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce
books, papers, records, or other data, the United States district court
for the district in which such person resides or is found shall have
jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance,
testimony, or production of books, papers, records, or other data."
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was directed to petitioner's accountant for the production of:
"All books, records, bank statements, cancelled
checks, deposit ticket copies, workpapers and all
other pertinent documents pertaining to the tax liability of the above taxpayer." "
The question is ·w hether the taxpayer may invoke
her Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory selfincrimination to prevent the production of her business
and tax records in the possession of her accountant.
Both the District Court 3 and Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit ·1 held the privilege unavailable. vYe
granted certiorari. U. S. - .
Petitioner is the sole proprietress of a restaurant.
Since 1955 she had given bank statements. payroll records, a11d reports of sales and expenditures to her
accountant, Harold Shaffer, for the purpose of preparing
her income tax returns. The accountant ,...-as not petitioner's personal employee but an independent contrac-·
tor with his own office and numerous other clients who,
compensated him on a piecework basis. ·when petitioner
surrendered possession of the records to Shaffer, she. of
course, retained title in herself.
During the summer of 1969, Internal Revenue Agent
Dennis Groves commenced an investigation of petitioner's
Appendix pp. 59-60.
The District Court held th::it ";,ince at the time the summons was
sen·cd, the taxp::iyrr , Lillian V. Couch. was not in possession of the
books , records and documents cle,cribrd in the summons. she m::iy not
assert any Fifth J.menclnwnt pri,·ilrl!e against self-incrimination as
a bar to the enforcement of the rnmmons." Appendix , pp. 6. 11.
The opinion of the District Court (i,YD Va.) is not reported.
4 The Court of Appe::ils al"o noted that the ans,Yer to petitioner's·
Fifth Amendment contentions b:,· in the fart th::it "the records were·
not in the inten-enor's f t::ixpa)·cr's] possession but ,Yere in the custod>·
of her account:mt ," 4-!9 F. 2d 141. (197-).
2

3
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tax returns. After exammmg her books and records
in Shaffer's office "·ith his permission, Groves found
indications of a substantial understatement of gross income. Groves thereupon reported the case to the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service.
Special Agent Jennings of the Intelligence Division
next commenced a joint investigation with Groves to
determine petitioner's correct tax liability, the possibility of income tax fraud and the imposition of tax fraud
penalties, and, lastly, the possibility of a recommendation of a criminal tax violation. Jennings first introduced himself to petitioner, gave her Jvliranda ,varnings
as required by IRS directive, and then issued the summons to Shaffer 5 after the latter refused to let him
see, remove, or microfilm petitioner's records.
5 The summons, ,vhich is printed in full in Appendix, pp. ,59-60, wa s
isued on August 18, 1969 , pursuant to 26 U. S. C. § 7602, which
proYides:

"EXAMINATION OF BoOKS A:N'D '\Vrr:NESSES.

"For the purpose of a~certaining the correctness of any return ,
making a return where none has been made. determining the liability
of an>· person for nny internal reYenue fox or the liability at law
or in equity of ain- transferee or fidurian· of any person in respect
of an>· internal revenue tax, or collecting an>· surh liability, the
Secretary or his dclegnte is :rnthorized" ( 1) To examine an>· books . papers. records , or other drrta "·hich
may be relevant or materi:11 to such in(Juir>·:
"(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform
the act, or an>· officer or employee of such person. or any person
having possession. custod~·, or care of books of acrount containing
entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or :1n~· other person the Secretary or his
delegate m:1~· deem proper. to ap11enr before the Secretary or his
delegate at a timr and place nnmed in the summons and to produce
such books, papers , records. or other data, and to give such testimon>·, under oath, as mn>· be rele,·nnt or mnterial to such inquiry;
:rnd
"(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath ,.
as nrny be rele,,ant or material to such inquiry."

71-889-0PINION
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·when Jennings arrived at Shaffer's office on September 2, 1969, the return day of the summons, to view
the record's, he found that Shaffer, at petitioner's request,
had delivered the documents to petitioner's attorney.
Jennings thereupon petitioned the District Court for
enforcement of the summons, and petitioner intervened,
asserting that the ownership of the records warranted
a Fifth Amendment privilege to bar their production. 6

I
It is now undisputed that a special agent is authorized, pursuant to 26 U. S. C. § 7602, to issue an Internal
Revenue summons in aid of a tax investigation with
civil and possible criminal consequences. 7 In Donaldson
v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 ( 1971), the Court upheld
such a summons, noting that:
"Congress clearly has authorized the use of the
summons in investigating what may prove to be
criminal conduct. . . . There is no statutory suggestion for any meaningful line of distinction, for
civil as compared with criminal purposes, at the
point of a special agent's appearance. . . . To draw
a line where a special agent appears would require
the Service, in a situation of suspected but undetermined fraud, to forgo either the use of the
summons or the potentiality of an ultimate recommendation for prosecution. We refuse to draw
6 Petitioner also claimed that enforcement of the summons would
violate her Fourth Amendment right to be secure from unreasonable
searches and seizures. ·we agree with the government, however,
that "this claim is not further articulated and does not appea.r to
be independent of her Fifth Amendment argument ." Gov. Brief, pp.
21-22. See part IV, infra.
7 There is clearly the joint civil and possibly criminal investigatory
purpose in the instant case, see p. - , supra.

71-889-0PINION

COUCH v. UNITED STATES

5.

that line and thus to stultify enforcement of federal
law." 400 U. S., at 535-536. 8
The Court in Donaldson noted that the taxpayer there·
had attempted to intervene, pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ_
Proc. 24 (a)(2), to bar production of records "in which
the taxpayer had no proprietary interest of any kind,
which are mvned by the third person, which a.re in his'.
hands, and which relate to the third person's business
transactions with the taxpayer." 400 U. S. 523. The
Court quite properly concluded that, under these facts,.
no absolute right to intervene existed. 400 U. S., at
530--531. The instant case, ho-wever, presents a different
question. Here petitioner does o-wn the business records which the Government seeks to review and thecourts below did permit her to intervene. The essential
inquiry is whether her proprietary interest further enables her to assert successfully a privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to bar enforcement of the
summons and production of the records, despite the fact
that the records no longer remained in her possession _

II
The importance of preserving inviolate the privilegeagainst compulsory self-incrimination has often been
stated by this Court and need not be elaborated. Coun-selman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384U. S. 436 (1966). By its very nature, the privilege is
an intimate and personal one. It respects a private
inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought and
8 Donaldson caution ed only that the summons be issued in good'
faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution. 400 ·
U. S., at 536. Neit her of those conditions is successfully challenged.
here.
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proscribes state intrusion to extract self-condemnation.
Historically, the privilege sprang from an abhorrence of
governmental assault against the single individual accused of crime and the temptation on the part of the
State to resort to the expedient of compelling incriminating evidence from one's own mouth. United States
Y. White, 322 U. S. 694, 698 (1944).
The Court has
thought the privilege necessary to prevent any "recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even
if not in their stark brutality," Ullman Y. United States,
350 U. S. 422, 428 (1956).
In Nlurphy Y. Waterfront Commission, 378 U. S. 52,
55 (1964), the Court articulated the policies and purposes
of the privilege:
" . . . our unwillingness to subject those suspected
of crime to the cruel trilemrna of self-accusation , perjury or contempt; our preference for an
accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of
criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating
statements ·will be elicited by inhumane treatment
and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates
'a fair state-individual balance by requiring the
government ... in its contest ,Yith the individual
to shoulder the entire load,' . . . our respect for
the inviolability of the human personality and of
the right of each individual 'to a prirnte enclave
where he may lead a private life.' ... "

It is important to reiterate that the Fifth ArnendmeHt
privilege is a personal privilege: it adheres basically
to the person, not to information which may incriminate him. As Mr. Justice Holmes put it: "A party
is privileged from producing the evidence but not from
its production." Johnson Y. United States, 228 U. S.
457, 458 (1913). The Constitution explicitly prohibits
compelling an accused to bear witness "against himself":
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it necessarily did not proscribe incriminating statements elicited from another. Compulsion upon the
person asserting it is an important element of the privilege, and "prohibition of compelling a man . . . to be
witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication
from him,," Holt v. United States, 218 U . S. 245, 252-253
(1910) (emphasis added). It is extortion of information from the accused himself that offends our sense
of justice.
In the case before us the ingredient of personal compulsion against an accused is lacking. The summons
and the order of the District Court enforcing it are
directed against the accountant.n He. not the taxpayer, is the only one compelled to do anything. And
the accountant makes no claim that he may tend
to be incriminated by the production. Inquisitorial
pressure or coercion against a potentially accused person,
compelling her, against her will, to utter self-condemning
words or produce incriminating documents is absent.
In the present case, no "shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by the accused"
is involved. Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757.
765 (1966).
The divulgence of potentially incriminating evidence
against petitioner is naturally unwelcomed. But petitioner's distress would be no less if the divulgence came
Technically the order to produce the records was directed to
petitioner's attornc~· since. a ftcr the summons was served upon the
accountant. he ignored it and surrendered the records to the attorney.
But constitutional rights ob,·iou~ly cannot be enlarged b~, this kind
of action. The rights and obligations of the parties became fixed
when the summons \Yas scn·cd. and the transfer did not alter them ..
See United Sta.tes Y. Za.kuta.n~ky, 401 F. 2d 68, 72 (CA7 1968) , cert.
denied, 393 U. S. 1021; United States'"· Lyons, 442 F. 2d 1144 (CAI
1971).
0
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not from her accountant but from some other third
party with whom she "·as connected and ,:vho possessed
substantially equivalent knowledge of her business affairs.
The basic complaint of petitioner stems from the fact
of divulgence of the possibly incriminating information,
not from the manner in which or the person from whom
it was extracted. Yet such divulgence, \Yhere it did not
coerce the accused herself, is a necessary part of the
process of law enforcement and tax investigation.

III
Petitioner's reliance on Boyd v. United Sta.tes, 116
U. S. 616 (1886) , is misplaced. In Boyd, the person
asserting the privilege was in possession of the written
statements in question. The Court in Boy.d did hold
that "any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's
own testimony or of his private papers to be used as
evidence to convict him of crime," violated the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments. 116 U. S. 630. That case
did not, however, address or contemplate the divergence
of ownership and possession,1° and petitioner concedes
that court decisions applying Boy.d have largely been
in instances where possession and ownership conjoined, 11
see, e. g., Hill v. Philpott, 445 F. 2d 144 (CA7 1971);
U. S. v. Judson, 63-2 USTC 9658 (CA9 1963). 12 In
10 A later Court commenting on the Boyd privilege noted that
"the papers and effects which the privilege protects must be the
private property of the person claiming the priYilege or at least in
his possession in a purely personal capacity." United Stat es v.
Tl'hite, 322 U. S. 694, 699 (1944) . (Emphasis added.)
11 Petitioner's Brief, pp. 13-14.
12 See also Unit ed Stat es v. Cohen, 388 F. 2d 464, 468 (CA9 1967),
where the court , in upholding the right of a possessor, nonowner to
assert the privilege, not ed that "it is possession of papers sought by
the government , not ownership , which sets the stage for exercise of the
gowrnmental compulsion which it is the purpose of the privilege
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Boyd, the production order was directed against the
ov.:ner of the property who, by responding, would have
been forced "to produce and authenticate any personal
documents or effects that might incrirnina.te hirn.'r
United States v. White, supra, at 698. But aga.in we
reiterate that in the instant case there was no enforced
communication of any kind from any accused or potential accused.
Petitioner ,vould, in effect, ha.ve us read Boyd to
ma.rk ownership, not possession, as the bounds of the
privilege, 1 3 despite the fact that possession bea.rs the
closest relationship to the personal compulsion forbidden
by the Fifth Amendment. To tie the privilege aga.inst
self-incrimina.tion to a concept of ownership would be
to draw a meaningless line. It would hold here that
the business records which petitioner actually owned
"·ould be protected in the hands of her accounta.nt, while
business information communicated to her accountant
by letter, conversations in which the accountant took
notes, in addition to the accountant's own workpapers
and photocopies of petitioner's records, would not be
subject to a cla.im of privilege since title rested in the·
accountant. Such a holding would thus place unnecessa.ry emphasis on the form of communication to an
accountant and the accountant's own working methodsr
while diverting the inquiry from the basic purposes
of the Fifth Amendment's protections.
Other precedents deba.ted by the parties lend no support to petitioner's contention that ownership of docuto prohibit." Though the insta nt case conrerns the scope of the·
privilege for an owner, nonpossessor, the Ninth Circuit's linkage of
possession to the purposes sen-ed by the privilege was appropriate.
We do not, of course, decide ,vhat qualifies as rightful possession
enabling the possessor to assert the privilege.
1 3 Petitioner's Brief, pp. 11-17.
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ments should determine the availability of the privilege.
In Perlman v. United States, 247 U. S. 7 (1918), the
Court held the privilege unavailable to a party seeking
to suppress the admission of incriminating documents
and exhibits before a grand jury. The movant's expectations of privacy in the exhibits had, according to the
Court. been destroyed when he voluntarily surrendered
the exhibits as evidence in a patent infringement case
he had earlier brought in Federal District Court. Peti1-1 Burdeau v. McDowell, 25G U. S. 4G5 (1921), :1lso debated and
eited in the briefs , held that the goyernment ma_\· retain for use
agninst their mn1Cr in a criminal proceeding incriminating documents which were stolen b_\· private indi\·iduals , without any governmental knowledge or complicity, and tnmed 0Yer to the goYernment. The Court, in denying the owner's pri,·ilege. alluded primnrily
to the ab~ence of any gO\·ernment:1I compulsion ag:1inst the accused,
the precise factor considered in the instant case. It is trne, as
petitioners argue, that the ca,e turns somewhat on n discussion of
gm·ernmental Yersus prinite compulsion and im·::ision, but it is
equally trne thnt the Comt in B1irdeau foiled to find any impermissible public compulsion on the owner in his absence of possession:
"We know of no constitutional prinriple which requires the O0\·ernment to rnrrender the papers under surh circumst:1nces. Had it
lc::irned th:1t such incriminatory paper~, tending to show a Yiolation
of federal law, were in the hands of a per.son other than the accused,
it having had no part in wrongfull_\• obtaining them. we know of
no reason why a subpoena. might not issue for the production of the
papers as evidence. Such production would require no nllreasonable
search and seizure. nor would it amount to compelling the accused
to testify against himself." 25G U. S., at 47G.
In .Johnson v. United States, supra, the Court held that the books
and records of a bankrupt transferred to a trustee in bankruptcy
could be used as evidence against the bankrupt in a prosecution for
concealing money from thr trustee. Unlike the instant case, both
title and possession passed in that tr,rnsfer and the record~ were, in
one sense, "published" by it. But the Court, in de11:1·ing the prn-ilege, recognized that the transfer also surreeded in removing the
important element of person::il compulsion ag:1inst the accused , 228
U. S. 459, just as, in this case, the nature of the diYestment of possession did.
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tioner's claims of ownership failed to overcome this
fact. The Court noted pertinently:
"But Perlman insists that he owned the exhibits and appears to contend that his ownership
exempted them from any use by the Government
without his consent. The extent of the insistence
is rather elusive of measurement. It seems to be
that the owner of property must be considered a.s
having a constructive possession of it wherever it
be and in whosesoever hands it be, and it is always,
therefore, in a kind of asylum of constitutional
privilege. And to be of avail the contention must
be pushed to this extreme. It is opposed, ho,rnver,
by all the cited cases. They, as we have said, make
the criterion of immunity not the o,rnership of
property but the 'physical or moral compulsion'
exerted." 247 U. S. 15.
Petitioner argues. nevertheless, that grave prejudice
will result from a denial of her claim to equate ownership and the scope of the privilege. She alleges that "if
the IRS is able to reach her records the instant those
records leave her hands and are deposited in the hands.
of her retainer whom she has hired for a special purpose then the meaning of the privilege is lost." 15 That
is not, however, the import of today's decision. We
do indeed believe that actual possession of documents
bears the most significant relationship to Fifth Amendment protections against state compulsions upon the
rn Id., p. 13. At oral argument petitioner raised a similar concern:
"The Go\·crnment goes so far to contend, I belie\·e, with their
theory that any time it i., out of :\'Our actual physical possession,
it is subject to subpoena . . . . If I were helping you across Constitution AYenue b_v carrying ~-om briefcase, the Government holds
that they could hand me a summons in the middle of Constitution
AYenue and seize )·our documents to use against you in a criminar
trial." Tr. of Oral Arg ., p. 14.
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individual accused of crime. Yet situations may well
arise where constructive possession is so clear or the
relinquishment of possession is so temporary and insignificant as to leave the personal compulsions upon
the accused substantially intact. 1 6 But this is not the
case before us. Here there was no mere fleeting divestment of possession: the records had been given to
this accountant regularly since 1955 and remained in
his continuous possession until the summer of 1968 when
the summons was issued.11 :Moreover, the accountant
himself worked neither in petitioner's office nor as his
employee.~ 8 The length of his possession of petitioner's
iG See, e. g., Schwimmer v. United Stat es, 232 F. 2d 855 (CA8
1956), which involved an attorney's partially successful motion to
quash two subpoenas duces tecum issued in a grand jur:, proceeding
against a corporation where t he attorney had stored his offi ce files.
See alrn United Stat es v. Guterma. 272 F. 2d 344 (CA2 1959) , concerning the storage of taxpayer's personal records in a sa fe in offices
of a corporation which t he taxpayer had served as Chairman of the
Board. Only t he taxpayer and an indicted co-defendant knew t he
combination of the sa fe, and the corporat ion had no access to it.
The Court of Appeals upheld the taxpayer's assertion of Fifth
Amendment privilege as to his personal records in the face of a grand
jury subpoena direct ed to the corporation.
Peti1ioner argues these cases support her position (Brief, pp. 14-15) ; the Government argues t hey ca n be distinguished from t he
inst:rnt case as involving mere custodial safekeeping of records, not
disclosure of their information to a t hird person (Brief, p. 21) . We
refrain from judging t he merits of such distinctions t oda~·17 Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 31.
1 8 As we noted, supra, p . - , his status is that of an independent
contractor. He actually did " very little work for the petitioner,"
had many ot her clients, and was compensat ed by the job. Tr. of
Oral Arg ., p . 8.
This is a significa nt point. The Government noted in oral
argument :
"In t he Internal R evenue Sen·ice practice, so long as the taxpayer
has reta ined possession of t he records and t hey are being used only
by his full-t ime employees or others on the taxpayer's premises, with-
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records and his independent status confirm the belief that
petitioner's divestment of possession was of such a character as to disqualify her entirely as an object of any
impermissible Fifth Amendment compulsion.

IV
Petitioner further argues that the confidential nature
of the accountant-client relationship and her resultingexpectation of privacy in delivering the records protect
her, under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, from
their production. Although not in itself controlling, we·
note that no confidential accountant-client privilege·
exists under federal law, and no State-created privilege
has been recognized in federal cases, Falsone v. Unitea
States, 205 F. 2d 734 (CA5 1953), cert. denied, 346U. S. 864; Gariepy v. United States, 189 F. 2d 459,
463-464 (CA6 1951); Himmelfarb v. United States,.
175 F. 2d 924, 939 (CA9 1949), cert. denied, 338U. S. 860; Olender v. United States, 210 F. 2d 795, 806
(CA9 1954). Kor is there justification for such a privilege where records relevant to income tax returns are
involved in a criminal investigation or prosecution. In
Boyd, a pre-income tax case, the Court spoke of protection of privacy, 116 U. S., at 630, but there can be little
expectation of privacy where records are handed to an
accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much
of the information therein is required in an income taxreturn. What information is not disclosed is largely
in the accountant's discretion , not petitioner's. Indeed,.
the accountant himself risks criminal prosecution if heout the taxpayer having relinquished possession or control of the
records, we ordinarily in those situations isrne the summons to the
taxpayer, because it is the taxpayer who has the dominion over the
records and the aut horit~· t o return the summons. And if the taxpayer chooses to plead the priYilege against self-incrimination, that
is up to the taxpayer ." Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 30.

71-889-0PI~ION
COUCH v. UNITED STATES

14

k1mwingly assists in the preparation of a false return.
26 U. S. C. § 7602 (2). His own need for self-protection
would often require the right to disclose the information given him. Petitioner seeks extensions of constitutional protections against self-incrimination in the
very situation where obligations of disclosure exist and
under a system largely dependent upon honest selfreporting even to survive. Accordingly, petitioner here
cannot reasonably claim, either for Fourth 19 or Fifth
Amendment purposes, an expectation of protected privacy or confidentiality.
V

The criterion for Fifth Amendment- immunity remains
not the ownership of property. but the "physical or
mora.l compulsion exerted." Perlman, supra, at 15. We
hold today that no Fourth or Fifth Amendment claim can
prevail where. as in this case, there exists no legitimate
expectation of privacy and no semblance of governmental compulsion against the person of the accused. 2 0
It is important, in applying constitutional principles,
10

See n. 6, s11pra.

The summons satisfied the requirements in

United States v. Poicell, 379 U. S. -18, 57-58 (1964), and, as explained aboYe. the necess:1ry expectation of prin1c~· to bunch a Yalid
Fourth Amendment rlnim does not exist. Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967).
00 The di,~rnting opinion of ~TH . .TusTICE :\J.~R"I-TALL implies tha.t.
the Court has created n "bright-line mlr thnt no ronstitutionnl right
of petitioner i, ,-iolntrd b~· rnforring a ;;:ummons of paprrs not in her
posse~sion." i\L~RoHALL . .T., cli,~mting. infra. p. - . Thi~ implication does not rdlrct arruratrl~· the position of the Court. Indeed ..
it ignores the lnngu:1gc of the Comt on pages 11-13. :rnd notes 15-18,
supra. We do indeed attach ronst ituti011:1l importance to possP;;:sion,
but only berau"e of it~ C'losr relation,-hip to those per~onnl compulsions and intru~ion~ which the Fifth Amrndment forbids. Yet,
rontr.lf_1- to an.1· intimation in the di~~ent. we do not adopt any
per se rule. '\Ve abo drcline to ronjecture broad!~· on the significance
of possession in ca~es and circumstances not before this Court _
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to interpret them in light of the fundamental interests
of personal liberty they were meant to serve. Respect
for these principles is eroded when they leap their
proper bounds to interfere with the legitimate interest
of society in enforcement of its laws and collection of
the revenues.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affinned.
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United States and Edward
Circuit.
F. Jennings, Etc.
[December -, 1972]

MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
On January 7, 1970, the Government filed a petition
in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, pursuant to 26 U. S. C. §§ 7402 (b)
and 7604 (a) ,1 seeking enforcement of an Internal Revenue summons in connection with an investigation of
petitioner's tax liability from 1964-1968. The summons
1

SEC.

7402.

Jumsnrc'l'ION OF D1S'rRIC'l' COURTS.

"(b) To Enforce Summons.-lf any person is summoned under
the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books,
papers, or other data , the district court of the United States for the
dist rict in which such person resides or may be found shall have
jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, or other data.
"SEc.

7604.

ENFORCEMEK'l' OF Sm,1M0Ns.

"(a ) Jurisdiction of District Court.-lf any person is summoned
under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce
books, papers, records, or other data , the United States distri ct court
for the district in which such person resides or is found shall have
jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance,
testimony, or production of books, papers, records, or other data. "

?

~S ./SS
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was directed to petitioner's accountant for the production of:
"All books, records, bank statements, cancelled
checks, deposit ticket copies, ,vorkpapers and all
other pertinent documents pertaining to the tax liability of the above taxpayer." 2
The question is whether the taxpayer may invoke
her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
to prevent the production of her business and tax records in the possession of her accountant. Both the
District Court 3 and Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit 4 held the privilege unavailable. \Ve granted
certiorari , U. S. - .
Petitioner is the sole proprietress of a restaurant.
Since 1955 she had giyen bank statements, payroll records, and reports of sales and expenditures to her
accountant, Harold Shaffer. for the purpose of preparing
her income tax returns. The accountant ,\·as not petitioner's personal employee but an independent contractor ,Yith his O\Yll office and num erous other clients who
compensated him on a piece\rnrk basis. "\Yh en petitioner
surrendered possession of the records to Shaffer, she. of
course. retained title in herself.
During the summer of 1969, Internal Revenue Agent
Dennis Groves commenced an investigation of petitioner's
Appendix pp. 59-60.
The Dist rict Court held that "since at the time the ~umrnons was
sen-eel. the t axpa>·er. Lilli:111 V. Couch. " ·as not in po,session of the
books. records and document~ de~c ribed in the summons. she m:i >· not
assert an>· Fifth Amendment priYilege :i g:i inst self-incrimination as
a bnr to the enforcement of the surnmon8." Appendix , pp. 6, 11.
The opinion of the District Court ('\YD Y:i.) is not reported.
4 The Court of Appenls also noted th.1t thr answer to pet itioner's
Fifth Amendment contention~ la>· in the fact that "t he records \\·ere
not in the int en ·enor's rt:ixpn~·er '~J po~oe~~ion but were in the custody
of her account:rnt ." 449 F. 2d 141. (197-).
2

3
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tax returns. After examining her books and records
in Shaffer's office with his permission , Groves found
indications of a substantial understatement of gross income. Groves thereupon reported the case to the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service.
Special Agent Jennings of the Intelligence Division
next commenced a joint investigation with Groves to
determine petitioner's correct tax liability, the possibility of income tax fraud and the imposition of tax fraud
penalties, and, lastly, the possibility of a recommendation of a criminal tax violation. Jennings first introduced himself to petitioner, gave her .Miranda ,rnrnings
as required by IRS directive, and then issued the summons to Shaffer '5 after the latter refused to let him
see, remove, or microfilrn petitioner's records.
5 The summons, which i,: printed in full in Appendix, pp. 59-60, w:is
isuecl on Aup;ust 18. 1969. pur~nant to 26 U. S. C. § 7602 , which
proYides
"Ex ,unNATrox OF Bomrn AXD '\V1TxE,-SES.
"For the purpo,:r of n,cert:iining the corrrctne;:, of :in>· return ,
mrtking a return where none h:is been mnde. determining the liability
of t1n>· person for :m>· intern:il reyenur t:ix or the liabilit~· at la\\or in equit>· of nn>· trnnsferee or fidurinr>· of :-in>· person in respect
of nn>· internnl re,·enue fax. or collecting nn>· such liability. the
SecretnrY or hi3 ddegnte is :rnthorized" (1) To examine nny books. paper;:. record,. or other dnta which
ma>· be relernnt or material to such inqnir~·:
"(2) To summon the person liable for tt1x or required to perform
the act, or an>· oiTicer or emploYee of surh person. or t1ny person
h:tYing possession , c11~tod~·, or cnre of books of account confaining
entries relating to the bui'ines,; of the prri'on liable for tax or required to perform the act, or an>· other per:-on the Secretary or his
delegate mn>· derm proper. to nppenr before the Secretary or his
delegate at a tinw :rnd pl:lre nnmed in the summon~ nnd to produce
such books, papers. records. or other clnta, and to giYe such testi-mon>·· under oath. as mn>· be rele,·;rnt or material to such inquiry ;

nnd
"(3) To take such testimon>· of the person concerned, under oath ,
as mn>· be relcYant or material to such inquiry."

.-
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·when Jennings arrived at Shaffer's office on September 2, 1969, the return day of the summons, to view
the records, he found that Shaffer, at petitioner's request,
had delivered the documents to petitioner's attorney.
Jennings thereupon petitioned the District Court for
enforcement of the summons, and petitioner intervened,
asserting that the o,vnership of the records warranted
a Fifth Amendment privilege to bar their production. 6

I
It is now undisputed that a special agent is authorized, pursuant to 26 U. S. C. ~ 7602, to issue an Internal
Revenue summons in aid of a tax investigation with
civil and possible criminal consequences.' In Donaldson
v. United States, 400 U. S. 517 (1971), the Court upheld
such a summons, noting that:
"Congress clearly has authorized the use of thesummons in investigating what may prove to be
criminal conduct. . . . There is no statutory suggestion for any meaningful line of distinction, for
civil as compared with criminal purposes, at the
point of a special agent's appearance. . . . To draw
a line where a special agent appears ,rnuld require
the Service, in a situation of suspected but undetermined fraud, to forgo either the use of thesummons or the potentiality of an ultimate recommendation for prosecution. We refuse to draw
We note that petitioner also claimed that enforcement of the
summons would violate her Fourth Amendment right to be secure
from unreasonable searches and seizures. We agree with the government, however, that "this claim is not further articulated and does
not appear to be independent of her Fifth Amendment argument."
___
...... ~
Gov. Brief, pp. 21-22.
7
There is clearly t h ~ ! and possibly criminal in\"cstigatory ~
purpose in the instant case, sec p. - , supra.
6
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that line and thus to stultify enforcement of federal
law." 400 U. S., at 535-536. 8
The Court in Donaldson noted that the taxpayer there
had attempted to intervene, pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 24 (a) ( 2) , to bar production of records "in which
the taxpayer had no proprietary interest of any kind,
which are owned by the third person, which are in his
hands, and which relate to the third person's business.
transactions with the taxpayer." 400 U. S. 523. The·
Court quite properly concluded that, under these facts,
no absolute right to intervene existed. 400 U. S., at
530-531. The instant case, however, presents a closer
question. Here petitioner does own the business records which the Government seeks to review and the
courts below did permit her to intervene. The essential
inquiry is whether her proprietary interest further en-•
ables her to assert successfully a privilege against selfincrimination to bar enforcement of the summons and'
production of the records, despite the fact that the
records no longer remained in her possession.

II
The importance of preserving inviolate the privilege·
against self-incrimination has often been stated by this
Court and need not be elaborated. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892); Chambers v. Florida, 309
U. S. 227 (1940); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). By its very
nature, the privilege is an intimate and personal one.
It respects a private inner sanctum of individual feelDonal,dson cautioned only that t he summons be issued in goodfaith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution . 400
U. S., at 536. Neither of those conditions is successfully challenged
here.
8
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ing and thought and proscribes state intrusion to extract self-condemnation.
Historically, the privilege
sprang from an abhorrence of governmental assault
against the single individual accused of crime and the
temptation on the part of the State to resort to the
expedient of compelling incriminating evidence from
one's O\Yn mouth. .Mira.nda, supra, at 460; United States
Y. White, 322 U. S. 694, 698 (1944); Chambers, supra,
at 235-238. The Court has thought the privilege necessary to prevent any "recurrence of the Inquisition and
the Star Chamber. even if not in their stark brutality."
Ullman v. United States, 350 U. S. 422. 428 (1956) , and
it has recognized that "coercion can be mental as ,Yell
as physical, and that the blood of an accused is not
the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition."
Bw.ckburn Y. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199. 206 (1960).
In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U. S. 52,
55 ( 1964). the Court articula tee! the policies and purposes
of the priYilege against self-incrimination:
" . . . our unwillingness to subject those suspected
of crime to the cruel trilemrna of self-accusation, perjury or con tempt; our preference for an
accusa to rial rather than an inquisitorial system of
criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating
statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment
and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates
'a fair state-individual balance by requiring the
government . . . in its contest with the individual
to shoulder the entire load.' . . . our respect for
the inviolability of the human personality and of
the right of each individual 'to a private enclave
,Yhere he may lead a private life,' ... "

It is important to reiterate that the Fifth Amendment
privilege is a personal privilege: it adheres basically
to the person, not to information \Yhich may incriminate him. As Mr. Justice Holmes put it: "A party
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is privileged from producing the evidence but not from
its production.'' Johnson Y. United States, 228 U. S.
457. 458 (1913). The Constitution explicitly prohibits
compelling an accused to bear ,Yitness "against himself ' :
it necessarily did not proscribe incriminating statements elicited from another. Compulsion upon the
person asserting it is an important element of the privilege, and "prohibition of compelling a man ... to be
witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication
from him,," Halt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245 , 252-253
( 1910) (emphasis added). It is extortion of information from the accused himself that offends our sense
of justice and caused. for example, the Court in Chambers, supra, to condemn the protracted questioning and
cross-questioning of ignorant young tenant farmers by
state officers "in a fourth floor jail room. "·here as prisoners they ,Yere ,yithout friends. advisors or counselors,
and under circumstances calculated to break the strongest nerves and the stoutest resistance. " 309 U. S., at
238-239. Like\\·ise in ~M alloy , supra, the concern over
inquisitional coercion of an accused motivated the Court's
incorporation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
the States. 378 U. S., at 7-8.
In the case before us the ingredient of personal compulsion against an accused is lacking. The summons
and the order of the District Court enforcing it are
directed solely against the accountant. 0 He, not the
9 TrrhnirnJI~· the order to produrr the rrrord~ \\':-t~ directed to
petitioner's attornc~· ~inre. :-i fter thr ~ummon, was ser\'C'd upon the
arrount:-int, he iii;norwl it and surrendered the rerords to the :1ttorne~,.
But ron~titution::il right~ ob,·iousl~· rannot br enlarged b~· this kind
of action. Th r right~ and obliii;ation~ of the parties brrame fixed
when the summon~ was 8en·ed, am! the tr:,n~fer did not alter them.
Sec Unit rd Sta ti's ,·. Zakutan sky. 401 F. 2d 68. 72 (CA7 1968). cert..
denied, 393 U. S. 1021; Unitl'd Statrs v. Lyons, 442 F. 2d 1144 (CAI
1971).
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taxpayer , is the only one compelled to do anything.
And the accountant makes no claim that he may tend
to be incriminated by the production . Inquisitorial
pressure or coercion against a potentially accused person,
compelling her, against her will, to utter self-condemning
,rnrds or produce incriminating documents is absent.
In the present case, no "shadmY of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by the accused"
is involved. Schmerber Y . California, 384 U. S. 757,
765 (1966).
The divulgence of potentially incriminating evidence
against petition er is naturally unwelcomed. But petitioner's distress would be no less if the divulgence came
not from her accountant but from some other third
party with whom she was connected and ,Yho possessed
substantially equivalent knowledge of her business affairs.
The basic complaint of petitioner stems from the fact
of divulgence of the possibly incriminating information,
not from the manner in ,vhich or the person from whom
it was extracted. Yet such divulgence, where it did not
coerce the accused herself, is a necessary part of the
process of law enforcement and tax investigation.

III
P etitioner's reliance on Boyd v. United States, 116
U. S. 616 (1886) , is misplaced. In Boyd, the person
asserting the privilege was in possession of the written
statements in question. The Court in Boyd did hold
that "any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's
own testimony or of his private papers to be used as
evidence to convict him of crime," violated the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments. 116 U. S. 630. That case
did not, however, address or contemplate the divergence
of ownership and possession, 10 and petitioner concedes
10 A later Court commenting on t he B oyd privilege noted that
"the papers and effects which t he priYilege protects must be the
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that court decisions applying Boyd have largely been
in instances where possession and ownership conjoined,11
see, e. g., Hill Y. Philpott, 445 F. 2d 144 (CA7 1971 );
U. S. Y. Judson, 63- 2 USTC 9658 (CA9 1963). 12 In
Boyd, the production order ,vas directed against the
om1er of the property who, by responding. " ·ould have
been forced "to produce and authenticate any personal
documents or effects that might incriminate him."
United States Y. ·w hite, supra, at 698. But again ,rn
reiterate that in the instant case there was no enforced
communication of any kind from any accused or potential accused.
P etitioner would, in effect, have us read Boyd to
mark ownership, not possession, as the bounds of the
privilege,'" despite the fact that possession bears the
relationship to the personal compulsion forbidden by
the Fifth Amendment.. To tie the privilege against
self-incrimination to a concept of ownership would be
to draw a meaningless line. It would hold here that
the business records which petitioner actually owned
would be protected in the hands of her accountant, while
business information communicated to her accountant
private property of the person claiming the p1frilege or at least in
his possession in a purely personal capacity." United States v.
White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (19-JA). (Emphasis added.)
~
11 Petitioner's Brief. pp . 13-14.
C 14 t:f
12 See also United Stat es v. Cohen, 388 F. 2d 464, 468
967) ,
where the court , in upholding the right of a possessor , nonowner to
assert the privilege, not ed that "it is possession of papers sought by
the government , not ownership, which sets the stage for exercise of the
governmental compulsion which it i~ the purpose of the privilege
to prohibit." Though the insta n t case concerns the scope of the
p1frilege for an mvner, nonpossessor, the Kinth Circuit's linkage of
possession to the purpose~ :;cf\' ed by the privilege was app ropriate.
We do not , of cour~e, deride what qualifies as rightful possession
enabling the possessor to a~sert the pri\·ilege.
1 3 Petitioner's Brief, pp. 11-17.
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by letter, conversations in which the accountant took
notes, in addition to the accountant's own ,Yorkpapers
and photocopies of petitioner's records, ·would not be
subject to a claim of privilege since title rested in the
accountant. Such a holding would thus place unnesessary emphasis on the form of communication to an
accountant and the accountant's own working methods,
while diverting the inquiry from the basic purpm:es
of the Fifth Amendment's protections.
Other precedents debated by the parties lend no support to petitioner's contention that ownership of documents should determine the availability of the privilege. 14
Burdeau Y. McDoiccll. 256 U . 8 . 465 (1921), also debntcl..~ ~
eited in the brief". hrld tlrnt the ~-crnmenT mn)· retain for use
~
ngainst their 0\\71er in n crimina l procrrding incriminating docummts which wrrr stolen b,· priYnte individunb. without nny g~
mental knowledge or complicit)'. and turned oYer to the @5,·er~ment. The Court. in denying the O\rncr's pridege. alluded prinrnrily
to the absencr of an.,· go,·ernmentnl compubion against the nccused,
the precise foe-tor ronsidrred in t hr instant case. It is true , as
petitioners argnr, 1hat t he case t urns somr,Yhat on :i disrussion of
go,·ernmrntnl ,·er,n,: pri,·ate compul"ion and im·asion , but it is
rq1rn.lly true thnt the Comt in Burdeau failed to find nnv impermissible public compubion on the owner in his absence of possession:
" We know of no constitutional prinriple which requires the Gon·rnment to surrendrr the paper~ under such circumstances . Had it
learned that surh inrriminntor)· paper,; . tending to show a Yiolation
of fedrral law. \\'ere in the hand, of :i per"on other than the accused,
it hnYing had no part in ,nongfull)· obtaining them, wr know of
no reason wh~• a sub11orna might not is~ ue for the production of the
papers as evidence. Such production would require no unrca::!onable
sea r ch and seizure. nor 1rntilcl it :1mo11nt to rompclling the accused
to testif)· aga inst him,elf." 256 U. S., at 476.
In Johnson v. United States. supra. the Court held that the books
and records of a b:in krupt trnndenrd to a trnstee in bnnkruptcy
could be 11::!ed as r,·iclrnre against the bankrnpt in n pro,:ecution for
concealing mane:, from the trustee. Unlike the instant case, both
t itle nnd posse~,ion p:1 , "ed in that 1r:rnde r nncl the record::! \\'ere, in
one srnse, "publi::!hrcl" b~· it . But the Conrt , in denying the prn·i14

@_,,,
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In Perlman v. United States, 247 U. S. 7 (1918), the
Court held the privilege unavailable to a party seeking
to suppress the admission of incriminating documents
and exhibits before a grand jury. The movant's expectations of privacy in the exhibits had. according to th e
Court, been destroyed when he voluntarily surrendered
the exhibits as evidence in a patent infringement case
he had earlier brought in Federal District Court. Petitioner's claims of ownership failed to overcome this
fact. The Court noted pertinently:
"But Perlman insists that he mrn ed the exhibits and appears to contend that his O\rnership
exempted them from any use by the Government
" ·ithout his consent. The extent of the insistence
is rather elusive of measurement. It seems to be
that the o-wner of property must be considered as
having a constructive possession of it " ·herever it
be and in whosesoever hands it be, and it is always,
therefore, in a kind of asylum of constitutional
privilege. And to be of avail the contention must
be pushed to this extreme. It is opposed, ho\\·ever,
by all the cited cases. They, as ,ve have said. make
the criterion of immunity not the ownership of
property but the 'physical or moral compulsion'
exerted." 247 U. S. 15.
Petitioner argues, nevertheless. that grave prejudice
will result from a denial of her claim to equate O\Ynership and the scope of the privilege. She alleges that "if
the IRS is able to reach her records the instant those
records leave her hands and are deposited in the hands
of her retainer "·horn she has hired for a special purlege, recognized that the transfer also ~ucceeded in remo,·ing the
important element of per,;onal compulsion agninst the accused , 228
U. S. 459, just ns, in this case. the nnture of the di,·estment of possession did.
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pose then the meaning of the privilege is lost." 13 That
is not, however, the import of today's decision. ·w e
do indeed believe that actual possession of documents
bears the most significant relationship to Fifth Amendment protections against state compulsions upon the
individual accused of crime. Yet situations may well
arise where the relinquishment of possession is so temporary and insignificant as to leave the personal compulsions upon the accused substantially intact. 16 But
this is not the case before us. Here there ·was no mere
fleeting divestment of possession: the records had been
given to this accountant regularly since 1955 and remained in his continuous possession until the summer
rn Id., p. 13. At oral argument petitioner raised a similar concern:
"The Government goes so far to contend, I belie,·e. ,vith their
theory that any time it is out of :rnur actual physical possession,
it is subject to subpoena . . . . If 1 were helping you across Constitution Avenue by carrying your briefcase, the Government holds
that they could hand me a summons in the middle of Constitution
A,·enue and seize :rnur documents to use against you in a criminal
trial." Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 14.
16 Schwimmer v. United States. 232 F. 2d 855 (CA8 1956), involved
an attorney's partially successful motion to quash two subpoenas
duces tecum issued in a grand jury proceeding against a corporation
where the attorney had stored his office files. United States v.
Guterma, 272 F. 2d 344 (CA2 1959), concerned the storage of taxpayer's personal records in a safe in offices of a corporation which
the taxpayer had served as Chairman of the Board. Onl~· the taxpayer and an indicted co-defendant knew the combination of the
safe, and the corporation had no access to it. The Court of Appeals
upheld the taxpayer's assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege as to
his personal records in the face of a grand jury subpoena directed
to the coropration.
Petitioner argues these cases support his P_Osition LBri~,i pp. 14-~
15); the Governmcnt~'Tiie third party "possession" can oe- ais"~
tinguished from the instant case as invoh·ing mere custodial safekeeping of records, not disclosure of their information to a third person
(Brief, p. 21). '\Ve refrain from judging the merits of such distinctions today.
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of 1968 when the summons ,-ras issued. 17 :Moreover,.
the accountant himself neither worked in petitioner's
offic(§rfen1ploy. 18 The lengtrrof-hi:s--possession of petitioner's records and his independent status confirm the
belief that petitioner's divestment of possession was
of such a character as to disqualify her entirely as
an object of any impermissible Fifth Amendment
compulsion.
IV
Petitioner further argues that the confidential nature
of the accountant-client relationship and her resultingexpectation of privacy in delivering the records protect
her, under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, from
their production. Although not in itself controlling, we
note that no confidential accountant-client privilege
exists under federal law, and no state-created privilege
has been recognized in federal cases, Falsone v. United
States, 205 F. 2d 734 (CA5 1953), cert. denied, 346
U. S. 864; Gariepy v. United States, 189 F. 2d 459,
463-464 (CA6 1951); Himmelfarb v. United States,
Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 31.
As we noted , supra, p. - , his status is that of an independent
contractor. He actually did "very little work for the petitioner,"·
had many other clients, and was compensated by the job. Tr. of
Oral Arg., p. 8.
This is a significant point. The Government noted in oral
argument:
"In the Internal R evenue Sen-ice practice, so long as the taxpayer·
has reta ined possession of the records and they are being used only
by his full-time employees or others on the taxpayer's premises, without the taxpayer having relinquished possession or control of the
records, we ordinarily in those situations issue the summons to the
taxpayer, because it is the taxpayer who has the dominion over the
records and the authority to return the summons. And if the taxpayer chooses to plea d the privilege against self-incrimination, that
is up to the taxpayer." Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 30.
17

18

e"~
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175 F. 2d 924, 939 ( CA9 1949), cert. denied, 338
U. S. 860_; Olender v. United States, 210 F. 2d 795, 806
(C'A9'1954). N; r ~ there lustification for s uch a privilege " ·here records relevant to income tax returns are
involved in a criminal investigation or prosecution. In
Boyd, a pre-income tax case, the Court spoke of protection of privacy, 116 U. S., at 630, but there,.(6elittle
expectation of privacy where records are handed to an
accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much
of the information therein is required in an income tax
return. What information is not disclosed is largely
in the accountant's discretion, not petitioner's. Indeed,
the accountant himself risks criminal prosecution if he
knowingly assists in the preparation of a false return.
26 U. S. C. § 7602 (2). His own need for self-protection
,mule! often require the right to disclose the information given him. Petitioner seeks extensions of constitutional protections against self-incrimination in the
very situation "·here obligations of disclosure exist and
under a system largely dependent upon honest selfreporting even to survive. Accordingly, petitioner here
cannot reasonably claim, either for Fourth 10 or Fifth
Amendment purposes, an expectation of protected privacy or confidentiality.
V
Finally, petitioner notes that the complexity of tax
forms and income reporting require individuals to seek
assistance in completing tax returns. From this, she
argues that "the increased complexity of government
should not be used as an excuse whereby individuals
19 We rritcr;it e our belief, expre,~ed inn . G, supra. th:1t petitioner's
Fourth Amendment claim is neithrr drrpl>· ;irticubtcd or pressed
independently from the Fifth Amendment contrntions. At ;in>· rate,
the summons s;it isfied the requirements in United Statfs Y. Powell,
379 U. S. 48. 57-58 ( 19G4). ;incl, :1s expbined ;1 boYe, the neccssu ry
expectation of prirncy to launch a -rnlid Fourth Amendment cbim
does not exist . Kat z Y. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967).
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are compelled to forfeit basic rights" (Brief, p. 21).
The point apparently is that those who seek outside
expertise are penalized ,Yhile those who prepare returns
themselves are protected. To avoid such pena1ties, petitioner urges that the consultant-client relationship be
accorded constitutional protection.
YVe decline. however, to regard those \Yho seek professional assistance in preparing tax returns as a disfavored class somehow meriting a wrenching of Fifth
Amendment protections from their historic base. The
advantages of professional assistance are numerous and
obvious, and ,rn cannot believe that taxpayers " ·ill be
deterred from seeking such assistance by anything in
the present decision. 20

VI
The criterion for Fifth Amendment immunity remains
not the ownership of property. but the "physical or
moral compulsion exerted." P erlman , supra, at 15. We
hold toda.y that no Fifth Amendment privilege can prevail " ·h ere. as in this case , there exists no legitimate
expectation of privacy and no semblance of governmental compulsion against the person of the accused.
It is important, in applying constitutional principles,
to interpret them in light of the fundamental interests
of personal liberty they were meant to serve. Respect
for these principles is lessened and eroded " ·hen they
leap their proper bounds to interfere with the legitimate
interest of society in enforcement of its la,Ys and collection of the revenues.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
The prinriplc~ rnunriated in the irntant case necessa rily relate
to ta.x consultants. rrg:l!'dle~s of profession. DeliYering business
records in one's 11ossrs~ ion to an attorne~1 for use in the preparation
of a criminal prooecution ngn inst accu~rd ob,·ionsl~· raises constitutional considerations of a very different nature from those in the
insta nt case.
20
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MR. JusTICE POWELL delivered the op1mon of the
Court.
On January 7, 1970, the Government filed a petition
in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, pursuant to 26 U.S. C. §§ 7402 (b)
and 7604 (a),1 seeking enforcement of an Internal Revenue summons in connection with an investigation of
petitioner's tax liability from 1964-1968. The summons
1

SEC.

7402 .

JUHISDICTIO~ OF DISTRICT COURTS.

"(b) To Enforce Summons.- If any person is summoned under
the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify , or to produce books,
papers, or other data, the district court of the United States for the
district in which such person resides or may be found shall have
jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendn nce, testimony, or production of books, papers, or other dnta.
"SEC.

7604.

ENFORCEMEKT OF SUMMONS.

"(a) Jurisdiction of District Court.-If any person is summoned
under the internal revenue laws to appea r, to testify, or to produce
books, papers, records, or other data , the United States district court
for the district in which such person resides or is found shall have
jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance,
testimony, or production of books, papers, records, or other data."
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was directed to petitioner's accountant for the production of:
"All books, records, bank statements, cancelled
checks, deposit ticket copies, " ·orkpapers and all
other pertinent documents pertaining to the tax liability of the above taxpayer." ~
The question is whether the taxpayer may invoke
her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
to prevent the production of her business and tax records in the possession of her accountant. Both the
District Court 3 and Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit 4 held the privilege unavailable. We gra.nted
U. S. --.
certiorari. Petitioner is the sole proprietress of a restaurant.
Since 1955 she had given bank statements, payroll records. and reports of sales and expenditures to h er
accountant, Harold Shaffer. for the purpose of preparing
her income tax returns. The accountant was not petitioner's personal employee but an independent contractor with his own office and numerous other clients " ·ho
compensated him on a piecework basis. ·w hen petitioner
surrendered possession of the records to Shaffer. she, of
course. retained title in herself.
During the summer of 1969. Internal Revenue Agent
Dennis Groves commenced an investigation of petitioner's
~

Appendix pp. 59-G0.
The Dist rict Court held that "since at the time the summons was
sen·ed, the taxpayer. Lillian V. Couch, was not in possession of the
books. records and document~ de~rribed in the summons. she may not
assert a.n~· Fifth Amendment priYile!!:e against self-incrimination as
a bar to the enforcement of the summon8." Appendix, pp. 6, 11.
The opinion of the Dist rict Court C'iVD Va.) is not report ed.
4 The Court of Appeals abo noted 1hat the ans,Yer to petitioner's
Fifth Amendment contention~ by in the fact thnt "the records ,rere
not in the interYenor's [t::ixp:1Yer's] pos~ession bui were in t he custody
of her accountant," 449 F. 2d 141. (197-) .
3
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tax returns. After exammrng her books and records
in Shaffer's office with his permission , Groves found
indications of a. substantial understatement of gross income. Groves thereupon reported the case to the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service.
Special Agent Jennings of the Intelligence Division
next commenced a joint investigation with Groves to
determine petitioner's correct tax liability, the possibility of income tax fraud and the imposition of tax fraud
penalties, and, lastly, the possibility of a recommendation of a criminal tax violation . Jennings first introduced himself to petitioner, gave her J.vliranda warnings
as required by IRS directive, and then issued the summons to Shaffer '5 after the latter refused to let him
see. remove, or microfilm petitioner's records.
5 The summon,:, \l·hi eh is printed in full in Appendix, pp. 59-60, wfl s
io11E'd on August 18. 1969. pursuflnt to 26 U. S. C. § 7602, which
pro,·ides:

"EXAM IXA'l'TOX 01' BOOKS A::\"D "\YTTKES SES.

"For the purpo,:e of flscrrtflining the rorrertness of any return.
making a return where none ha, been maclr. determining the liability
of any per,:on for any internal re,·enue tnx or the liability at law
or in equit)· of fin~- transferee or fiduriar:, of a n~- person in respect
of n ny interna 1 revenu e tax. or collecting an~- such liability, the
Secretary or hi;:; delegate is aut horized" (I) To examine an)· books, paper~, records, or other data which
1rnt)· be rele,·ant or material to ~urh inquir~-;
"(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform
the art, or an:,- officer or employee of surh per~on. or an:v person
haYing pos~ession. rustod)·, or rare of books of account containing
entrie~ relating to the bu~ines, of the person liable for tax or required to perform the art, or an~- other per~on the Secretary or his
delegate ma)· drcm proper . to appear before the Secretar~- or hi~
delegate at a time and place named in the summons and to produce
such books, papers , records. or other data. and to giYe such testimony, under oath. as mn~- be relern nt or mflterial to rnch inquiry;
and
"(8) To take such testimon~· of the person concerned, under oath ,.
as may be rele,·ant or material to such inquiry."
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When Jennings arrived at Shaffer's office on September 2. 1969, the return day of the summons, to view
the records, he found that Shaffer, at petitioner's request,
had delivered the documents to petitioner's attorney.
Jennings thereupon petitioned the District Court for
enforcement of the summons, and petitioner intervened,
asserting that the ownership of the records ·warranted
a Fifth Amendment privilege to bar their production. 6

I
It is now undisputed that a special agent is authorized, pursuant to 26 U. S. C. § 7602, to issue an Internal
Revenue summons in aid of a tax investigation with
civil and possible criminal consequences.' In Donaldson
v. United States, 400 U. S. 517 ( 1971) , the Court upheld
such a summons, noting that:
"Congress clearly has authorized the use of the
summons in investigating what may prove to be
criminal conduct. . . . There is no statutory suggestion for any meaningful line of distinction , for
civil as compared with criminal purposes, at the
point of a special agent's appearance. . . . To draw
a line where a special agent appears would require
the Service, in a situation of suspected but undetermined fraud, to forgo either the use of the
summons or the potentiality of an ultimate recommendation for prosecution. We refuse to draw
Petitioner also claimed that enforcement of the summons would
violate her Fourth Amendment right to be secure from unreasonable
searches and seizures. We agree with the government, however,
that "this claim is not further articulated and does not appear to
be independent of her Fifth Amendment argument." Gov. Brief, pp.
21-22. See part IV, infra.
7 There is clearly the joint civil and possibly criminal investigatory
purpose in the instant case, see p. - , supra.
6
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that line and thus to stultify enforcement of federal
law." 400 U. S., at 535-536. 8
The Court in Donaldson noted that the taxpayer there
had attempted to intervene, pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 24 (a) (2), to bar production of records "in which
the taxpayer had no proprietary interest of any kind,
which are owned by the third person, which are in his
hands, and which relate to the third person 's business
transactions with the taxpayer. " 400 U. S. 523. The
Court quite properly concluded that, under these facts,
no absolute right to intervene existed. 400 U. S .. at
530-531. The instant case, however, presents a closer
question. Here petitioner does own the business records which the Government seeks to review and the
courts below did permit her to intervene. The essential
inquiry is whether her proprietary interest further enables her to assert successfully a privilege against selfincrimination to bar enforcement of the summons and
production of the records, despite the fact that the
records no longer remained in her possession.

II
The importance of preserving inviolate the privilege
against self-incrimination has often been stated by this
Court and need not be elaborated. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892); Chambers v. Florida, 309
U.S. 227 (1940); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). By its very
nature, the privilege is an intimate and personal one.
It respects a private inner sanctum of individual feelDonaldson cautioned only that the summons be issued in good
faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution. 400
U. S., at 536. Neither of those conditions is successfully challenged
here.
8
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ing and thought and proscribes state intrusion to extra.ct self-condemnation . Histo rically, the privilege
sprang from an abhorrence of governmental assault
against the single individual accused of crime and the
temptation on the part of the State to resort to the
expedient of compelling incriminating evidence from
one's own mouth . .1l1iranda, supra, at 460; United States
Y. White, 322 U . S. 694, 698 (1944); Chambers , supra.,
at 235-238. The Court has thought the privilege necessary to prevent any "recurrence of the Inquisition and
the Star Chamber. even if not in their stark brutality,"
Ullman v. United States, 350 u. S. 422. 428 (1956), and
it has recognized that "coercion can be mental as well
as physical, and that the blood of an accused is not
the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition."
Blackburn v. Alabarna, 361 U. S. 199, 206 (1960).
In Murphy Y. fVat erfront Commission, 378 U. S. 52,
55 ( 1964), the Court articulated the policies and purposes
of the privilege against self-incrimination:
" . . . our unwillingness to subject those suspected
of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an
accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of
criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating
statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment
and abuses; our sense of fair play " ·hich dictates
'a fair state-individual balance by requiring the
government ... in its contest with the individual
to shoulder the entire load.' . . . our respect for
the inviolability of the human personality and of
the right of each individual 'to a private enclave
where he may lead a private life.' ... "

It is important to reiterate that the Fifth Am endment
privilege is a personal privilege : it adheres basically
to the person , not to information which may incriminate him. As Mr. Justice Holmes put it: "A party
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is privileged from producing the evidence but not from
its production." Johnson v. United States, 228 U. S.
457, 458 ( 1913) . The Constitution explicitly prohibits
compelling an accused to bea.r v,·itness "aga.inst himself" :
it necessa.rily did not proscribe incriminating sta.tements elicited from another. Compulsion upon the
person asserting it is a.n important element of the privilege, and "prohibition of compelling a ma.n . . . to be
witness against himself is a. prohibition of the use of
physica.l or moral compulsion to extort communication
from him,," Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 252-253
(1910) (emphasis added). It is extortion of informa.tion from the accused himself that offends our sense
of justice and caused, for example. the Court in Chambers, si1pra, to condemn the protracted questioning and
cross-questioning of ignorant young tenant farmers by
state officers "in a. fourth floor jail room, where as prisoners they were ,vithout friends, advisors or counselors,
and under circumstances calculated to break the strongest nerves and the stoutest resistance." 309 U. S., at
238-239. Likewise in ~Malloy, supra, the concern over
inquisitional coercion of an accused motivated the Court's
incorpora.tion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
the States. 378 U. S., at 7-8.
In the case before us the ingredient of personal compulsion against an accused is lacking. The summons
and the order of the District Court enforcing it are
directed against the accountant. 0 He. not the tax9 Teclmir;ill>· the order to produre tho records w11s directed to
petitioner's attorney since, after the summons w,1s sen·ed upon the
accountant, he ignored it ,md surrendered the records to the attorney .
But constitutional right, ob,·iou8ly cannot be enlarged b>· this kind
of action. The rights ;incl obligation~ of the parties became fixed
when the summon, ,ms sorwd, and the tnmsfrr did not alter them.
See United States v. Zakittan.~ky. 401 F. 2d 68, 72 (CA7 1968) , cert..
denied, 393 U. S. 1021; United States v. Lyon,,, 442 F. 2d 1144 (CAI
1971).
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payer, is the only one compelled to do anything. And
the accountant makes no claim that he may tend
to be incriminated by the production. Inquisitorial
pressure or coercion against a potentially accused person,
compelling her, against her will, to utter self-condemning
"·ords or produce incriminating documents is absent.
In the present case, no "shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by the accused"
is involved. Schmerber Y. California, 384 U. S. 757,
765 (1966).
The divulgence of potentially incriminating evidence
against petitioner is naturally unwelcomecl. But petitioner's distress ,mule! be no less if the divulgence came
not from her accountant but from some other third
party with whom she ,vas connected and who possessed
substantially equiva.lent knowledge of her business affairs.
The basic complaint of petitioner stems from the fact
of divulgence of the possibly incriminating information,
not from the manner in which or the person from ·whom
it was extracted. Yet such divulgence, where it did not
coerce the accused herself, is a necessary part of the
process of law enforcement and tax investigation.

III
Petitioner's reliance on Boyd v. United States, 116
U. S. 616 (1886) , is misplaced. In Boyd, the person
asserting the privilege was in possession of the written
statements in question. The Court in Boyd did hold
that "any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's
mvn testimony or of his private papers to be used as
evidence to convict him of crime," violated the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments. 116 U. S. 630. That case
did not, however, address or contemplate the divergence
of ownership and possession,1° and petitioner concedes
10
A lat er Court commenting on t he Boyd privilege noted that
"the papers and effects which the priYilege protect s must be the
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that court decisions applying Boyd have largely been
in instances where possession and ownership conjoined, 11
see. e. g., Hill v. Philpott, 445 F. 2d 144 (CA7 1971);
U. S . v. Judson, 63-2 USTC 9658 (CA9 1963).]2 In
Boyd, the production order was directed against the
owner of the property who, by responding, would have
been forced "to produce and authenticate any personal
documents or effects that might incriminate him."
United States v. Whit e, supra, at 698. But again we
reiterate that in the instant case there was no enforced
communication of any kind from any accused or potential accused.
Petitioner would, in effect, have us read Boyd to
mark ownership, not possession, as the bounds of the
privilege, 13 despite the fact that possession bears the
closest relationship to the personal compulsion forbidden
by the Fifth Amendment. To tie the privilege against
self-incrimination to a concept of ownership would be
to draw a meaningless line. It would hold here that
the business records which petitioner actually owned
would be protected in the hands of her accountant, while
business information communicated to her accountant
private property of the person claiming the privilege or at least in
his possession in a purely personal capacity." United States v.
White, 322 U. S. 694, 699 (1944). (Emphasis added.)
11 Petitioner's Brief, pp. 13-14.
12 See also United States v. Cohen, 388 F. 2d 464, 468 (CA9 1967) ,
where the court, in upholding the right of a possessor, nonowner to
assert the privilege, noted that "it is possession of papers sought by
the government, not ownership, which sets the stage for exercise of the
governmental compulsion which it is the purpo~e of the privilege
to prohibit." Though the instant case concerns the scope of the
privilege for an owner, nonpossessor, the Ninth Circuit's linkage of
possession to the purposes served by the privilege was appropriate.
We do not, of cour~e, decide what qualifies as rightful possession
enabling the possessor to assert the privilege.
13 Petitioner's Brief, pp. 11-17.
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by letter, conversations in which the accountant took
notes, in addition to the accountant's own workpapers
and photocopies of petitioner's records, ,rnuld not be
subject to a claim of privilege since title rested in the
accountant. Such a holding would thus place unnesessary emphasis on the form of communication to an
accountant and the accountant's o,Yn " ·orking methods,
while diverting the inquiry from the basic purpoE=es
of the Fifth Amendment's protections.
Other precedents debated by the parties lend no support to petitioner's contention that o,rnership of documents should determine the availability of the privilege. 14
"'Burdeau Y. McDmc ell. 256 U. S. 465 (1921), al,o debated :rnd
rited in the briefs. held that the government ma~· retain for use
against their o,n1er in a rriminn l procrrcl.ing incriminating clor:unwnts \\"hich were Rtolcn bv prirnte incli,·iduals, ,Yitho11t an~· govrrnmentnl kno\\"leclge or romplicitY. and turned owr to thr go,·ernm ent. The Court. in clen>·ing the O\rner'~ pri,·ilege. allnd rd primarily
to t he absence of nn~· goYernment:11 compul:-ion against the acc11,ed,
the precise factor considered in the instant case. It i, trur, as
petitioners argue. that the case turns rnmr\\"hat on a disrnssion of
goYernment3l Yer,us priYatc compulsion :rnd i11Ya,ion , but it i~
equall~· true that thr Court in B urdeou foiled to find :inY imprrmissiblc publi c compulsion on thr o\\"ncr in his :ibsen re of possrssion:
" 'Ve know of no constitutional principle whi ch rcquirrs tl1e GoYrrnment to surren drr the papers under such circumstanrr:-. Had it
lra rn rd that such inrriminatorr paper~. tending to sho\\" 11 Yiola t ion
of fer\ernl law. were in t he hand~ of a prr~on othrr thrm t he accused,
it h:i,·ing had no pnrt in \\Tong;fullv obt:iininµ: them, \\"C' know of
no reason why a subporn:i might not issue fo r the production of the
p:1pers ns eYiclencc. SuC'h production would require no unreasonable
,:r:i rC'h :-incl seizure. nor would it amount to compelling t he aC'cu~ed
to tr~tify ngn in,:t him"clf." 25G U. S., at 476 .
Tn Johnson v. United States. siipra, the Court hdcl t ha t the books
and re C'ords of a bankrupt trnn~frrrcd to a trustee in bankruptcy
could be u~ecl as C'Yidenrc :-ign in~t the bankrupt in a pro,ecution for
conre11ling mone, · from the trustre. Unlike the in,:tnnt case. both
title and possr~sion p:-is,:rcl in tha t trnnsfrr nnd the records were, in
one sense, "publish rcl" b>· it. But the Court. in den~·ing the pnYi-
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In Perlnian v. United States, 247 U. S. 7 (1918), the
Court held the privilege unavailable to a party seeking
to suppress the admission of incriminating documents
and exhibits before a grand jury. The movant's expectations of privacy in the exhibits had, according to the
Court, been destroyed when he voluntarily surrendered
the exhibits as evidence in a patent infringement case
he had earlier brought in Federal District Court. Petitioner's claims of ownership failed to overcome this
fact. The Court noted pertinently:
"But Perlman insists that he om1ed the exhibits and appears to contend that his o,rnership
exempted them from any use by the Government
,vithout his consent. The extent of the insistence
is rather elusive of measurement. It seems to be
that the owner of property must be considered as
having a constructive possession of it wherever it
be and in whosesoever hands it be, and it is always,
therefore. in a kind of asylum of constitutional
privilege. And to be of avail the contention must
be pushed to this extreme. It is opposed, however ,
by all the cited cases. They, as we have said, make
the criterion of immunity not the ownership of
property but the 'physical or moral compulsion '
exerted. " 247 U. S. 15.
Petitioner argues, neverth eless. that grave prejudice
will result from a denial of her claim to equate om1ership and the scope of the privilege. She alleges that "if
the IRS is able to reach her records the instant those
records leave her hands and are deposited in the hands
of her retain er "·horn she has hired for a special purlegc, recognized that the tran~fer also succeeded in remoYing the
important element of percon,tl compulsion ag,1inst the accused, 228
U. S. 459 , just as, in thi~ ca~e, ihe nat ure of the diYestment of possession did .
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pose then the meaning of the privilege is lost .. , Jo That
is not, however, the import of today's decision. vVe
do indeed believe that actual possession of documents
bears the most significant relationship to Fifth Amendment protections against state compulsions upon the
individual accused of crime. Yet situations may well
arise where the relinquishment of possession is so temporary and insignificant as to leave the personal compulsions upon the accused substantially intact.J G But
this is not the case before us. Here there was no mere
fleeting divestment of possession: the records had been
given to this accountant regularly since 1955 and remained in his continuous possession until the summer
Id., p. 13. At oral argument petitioner raised a similar concern:
"The Government gors 80 far to contend, I believe. "·ith their
theory that an>· time it is out of ~-our actual physical possession,
it i~ subj ect to subpoena . . . . If I were helping you across Constitution Avenue by carrying your briefcase, the Government holds
that they could hand me a summons in the middle of Constitution
Avenue and seize your documents to use against you in a criminal
trial." Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 14.
JG Schwimmer v. United States. 232 F. 2d 855 (CAS 1956), invoh·ed
an attorney's parfrilly successful motion to quash two subpoenas
cluces tecum issued in a grand jury proceeding against a corporation
where the attorney had stored his office files. United States v.
Guterma, 272 F. 2d 344 (CA2 1959), concerned the storage of taxpa?er's personal record~ in a safe in offices of a corporation which
the taxpa>·er had served as Chairman of the Board. Only the taxpayer and an indicted co-defendant knew the combination of the
safe, and the corporation had no access to it. The Court of Appeals
upheld the taxpayer's assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege as to
his personal records in the face of a grand jury subpoena directed
to the corporation.
Petitioner argues these cases support his position (Brief, pp. 1415) ; the Government argues they can be distinguished from the
instant case as involving mere custodial safekeeping of records, not
disclosure of their information to a third person (Brief, p. 21). We
refrain from judging the merits of such distinctions today.
15
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of 1968 when the summons ·was issued." Moreover,
the accountant himself worked neither in petitioner's
office nor as his employee. 18 The length of his possession
of petitioner's records and his independent status confirm the belief that petitioner's divestment of possession
was of such a character as to disqualify her entirely as
an object of any impermissible Fifth Amendment
compulsion .

IV
Petitioner further argues that the confidential nature
of the accountant-client relationship and her resulting
expectation of privacy in delivering the records protect
her, under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, from
their production. Although not in itself controlling, we
note that no confidential accountant-client privilege
exists under fed eral law, and no state-created privilege
has been recognized in federal cases, Falsone v. United
States, 205 F. 2d 734 (CA5 1953), cert. denied, 346
U . S. 864; Gariep y v. United States, 189 F . 2d 459,
463- 464 (CA6 1951); Himm elfarb Y. United States,
Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 31.
As we noted, supra, p. - , his status is that of an independent
contractor. H e actuall? did "very little work for the petitioner,"
had many other clients, and was compensated by the job. Tr. of
Oral Arg., p. 8.
This is a significant point . The Government noted in oral
argument:
17

18

"In the Internal Revenue Sen-ice practice, so long as the taxpayer
has retain ed possession of the records and t hey are being used only
by his full-time employees or others on the taxpayer's premises, without the taxpayer ha,·ing relinquished possession or control of the
records, we ordinaril~· in those sit uations issue the summons to the
taxpayer, because it is the taxpayer who has the dominion over the
records and the au thority to return the summons. And if the tax-payer chooses t o plead the priYilege against self-incrimination, that
is up to the taxpayer ." Tr. of Oral Arg., p . 30.

71-889-0PINION
14

COUCH v. UNITED STATES

175 F. 2d 924, 939 ( C.:-\.9 1949) , cert. denied , 338
U. S. 860; Olender v. United States, 210 F. 2d 795, 806
(CA9 1954). Nor is there justification for such a privilege where records relevant to income tax returns are
involved in a criminal investigation or prosecution. In
Boyd, a pre-income tax case, the Court spoke of protection of privacy. 116 U. S., at 630, but there can be little
expectation of privacy where records are handed to an
accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much
of the information therein is required in an income tax
return. What information is not disclosed is largely
in the accountant's discretion , not petitioner's. Indeed,
the accountant himself risks criminal prosecution if he
knowingly assists in the preparation of a false return.
26 U . S. C. § 7602 (2) . His own need for self-protection
would often require the right to disclose the information given him. Petitioner seeks extensions of constitutional protections against self-incrimination in the
very situation where obligations of disclosure exist and
under a system largely dependent upon honest selfreporting even to survive. Accordingly, petitioner here
cannot reasonably claim, either for Fourth 1 9 or Fifth
Amendment purposes, an expectation of protected privacy or confidentiality.
V
The criterion for Fifth Amendment immunity remains
not the ownership of property, but the "physical or
moral compulsion exerted." Perlman , supra, at 15. "\Ve
hold today that no Fourth or Fifth Amendment claim can
prevail where, as in this case, there exists no legitimate
expectation of privacy and no semblance of governrn See n. 6, su pra. The rnmmons 8a tisfied the requirements in
United States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48 , 57-58 (1964) , and , as explained nbove, the necessa r~· expectat ion of pri1·acy to launch a ,·alicl
Fourth Amendment rlajm does not exist. K atz \'. United States, 389
U.S . 347 (1967).
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mental compulsion against the person of the accused.
It is important, in applying constitutional principles,
to interpret them in light of the fundamental interests
of personal liberty they were meant to serve. Respect
for these principles is lessened and eroded when they
leap their proper bounds to interfere with the legitima.te
interest of society in enforcement of its la"·s and collection of the revenues.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the op1111on of the
Court.
On January 7, 1970, the Government filed a petition
in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, pursuant to 26 U. S. C. §§ 7402 (b)
and 7604 (a) ,1 seeking enforcement of an Internal Revenue summons in connection with an investigation of
petitioner's tax liability from 1964-1968. The summons
1

SEC.

7402.

JURISDICTION OF DrSTRIC'I' COURTS.

"(b) To Enforce Summons.-If any person is summoned under
the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books,
papers, or other data , the district court of the United States for the
district in which such person resides or may be found shall have
jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, or other data.
"SEC.

7604.

ENFORCEMENT OF SUMMONS.

"(a) Jurisdiction of District Court.-If any person is summoned
under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce
books , papers, records, or other data, the United States district court
for the district in which such person resides or is found shall have
jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance,
testimony, or production of books, papers, records , or other data."

-
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"·as directed to petitioner's accountant for the production of:
"All books, records, bank statements, cancelled
checks, deposit ticket copies, workpapers and all
other pertinent documents pertaining to the tax liability of the above taxpayer." ~
The question is whether the taxpayer may invoke
her Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory selfincrimination to prevent the production of her business
and tax records in the possession of her accountant.
Both the District Court 3 and Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit ·1 held the privilege unavailable. We
granted certiorari, U. S. - .
Petitioner is the sole proprietress of a restaurant.
Since 1955 she had given bank statements. payroll records, and reports of sales and expenditures to her
accountant, Harold Shaffer. for the purpose of preparing
her income tax returns. The accountant was not petitioner's personal employee but an independent contractor ,Yith his own office and numerous other clients who
compensated him on a piecework basis. \Vhen petitioner
surrendered possession of the records to Shaffer, she. of
course, retained title in herself.
During the summer of 1969, Internal Revenue Agent
Dennis Groves commenced an investigation of petitioner's
Appendix pp. 59-60.
The Dist ri ct Court held that "sin ce at the time the summons was
sen·ed, the taxpa~·rr, Lillian V. Coueh , was not in possession of the
books, records and document~ desrribed in the summons. she may not
assert any Fifth Amendment pri\·ilege against self-inrrimination as
a bar to the en fo rcemen t of t he summon~." Appendix, pp. 6, 11.
The opinion of th e District Comt CWD Va.) is not report ed .
•· The Court of Appeals al8o noted tl1 at the anS\Yer to petitioner's
Fifth Amendmen t contentions by in the foct that "the record., were
not in the inter n'uor's rtaxpa:-,·er's] pos;:es,ion but were in the custody
of her account:mt ," 449 F. 2d 141 , (197-).
2

3
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tax returns. After exammmg her books and records
in Shaffer's office ,yith his permission , Groves found
indications of a substantial understatement of gross income. Groves thereupon reported the case to the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service.
Special Agent Jennings of the Intelligence Division
next commenced a joint investigation with Groves to
determine petitioner's correct tax liability, the possibility of income tax fraud and the imposition of tax fraud
penalties, and, lastly, the possibility of a recommendation of a criminal tax violation . Jennings first introduced himself to petitioner, gave her Nliranda warnings
as required by IRS directive, and then issued the summons to Shaffer ;s after the latter refused to let him
see, remove, or microfilm petitioner's records.
5 The summons, whic-h is printed in full in Appendix, pp. 59-60, w:is
isued on Augu,t 18 . 1969. pumiant to 26 U. S. C. § 7602, which
p roYides:
"ExA::.II~ATIOX 01' Boom, A::s'D "\VnKESSES .
"For the purpose of n~crrt nining the corrertne~s of an >' return ,
nrn,king a return where none lrn , been mad0. determining the liability
of :my person for nny in tcrnnl reYenu e tax or the liability at law
or in equit>· of any tr:msferec or fiduri:iry of any pl"'rson in respect
of an>· intcrnn.l ren·nuc tax, or collecting any such li ability, the
Serret n.rY or his delrg:ite is :iut horized" (1) To examine any books. pnper,, records, or other d:ita which
ma>· be relernnt or materi:il to such inquir~·;
"(2) To f:u mmon the person liable fo r tax or required to perform
the a.ct, or an>· officer or employee of such p erson , or any person
h:n-ing possession , cu,tocl>·, or care of books of account containing
entries rcbt ing to t he bu,inc,, of the person lii1 ble for tax or required to perform the :ict, or an>· other prr,on t he Secretary or his
dekg:ite ma_\· df'em proper. to appen r before the Secretary or his
delegate at a time :ind plnce 1rnmf'd in the summons and to produ ce
such books, pnper~. rerord~. or other data. and to gi ve such testimon:,·. under oath. :is m:1,\· br rele\·:int or material to ,uch inqu iry ;
nnd
" (3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath ,
n, m:i~· be relcYant or material to such inquiry."
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When Jennings arrived at Shaffer's office on September 2, 1969, the return day of the summons, to view
the records, he found that Shaffer, at petitioner's request,
had delivered the documents to petitioner's attorney.
Jennings thereupon petitioned the District Court for
enforcement of the summons, and petitioner intervened,
asserting that the ownership of the records warranted
a Fifth Amendment privilege to bar their production.s.

I
It is now undisputed that a special agent is authorized, pursuant to 26 U . S. C. ~ 7602. to issue an Internal
Revenue summons in aid of a tax investigation with
civil and possible criminal consequences.' In Donaldson
v. United States, 400 U. S. 517 ( 1971) , the Court upheld
such a summons, noting that:
"Congress clearly has authorized the use of the
summons in investigating what may prove to be
criminal conduct. . . . There is no statutory suggestion for any meaningful line of distinction , for
civil as compared with criminal purposes, at the
point of a special agent's appearance. . . . To draw
a line where a special agent appears would require
the Service, in a situation of suspected but undetermined fraud , to forgo either the use of the
summons or the potentiality of an ultimate recommendation for prosecution. We refu se to draw
G P etitioner also claimed that enforcement of t he summons would
violat e her Fou rth Amendment right to be secure from unreasonable
searches and seizures. Vi7 e agree with the government, however,
that "this claim is not furth er art iculated and does not appear to
be independent of her Fifth Amendment argument ." Gov. Brief, pp.
21-22. See part IV, inf ra.
• There is clearl y t he joint civil and possibly criminal investigatory
purpose in the instant case, see p. - , supra.
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that line and thus to stultify enforcement of federal
law." 400 U. S., at 535--536. 8
The Court in Donaldson noted that the taxpayer there·
had attempted to intervene, pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 24 (a) (2), to bar production of records "in which
the taxpayer had no proprietary interest of any kind,
which are owned by the third person, which are in his
hands, and which relate to the third person's business
transactions with the taxpayer." 400 U. S. 523. The
Court quite properly concluded that, under these facts,
no absolute right to intervene existed. 400 U. S., at
530-531. The instant case, however, presents a closer
question. Here petitioner does own the business records which the Government seeks to review and the·
courts below did permit her to intervene. The essential
inquiry is whether her proprietary interest further enables her to assert successfully a privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to bar enforcement of the
summons and production of the records, despite the fact
that the records no longer remained in her possession_

II
The importance of preserving inviolate the privilege·
against compulsory self-incrimination has often been
stated by this Court and need not be elaborated. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U. S. 436 (1966). By its very nature, the privilege is
an intimate and personal on e. It respects a private
inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought and
D onaldson cautioned onl~· that the summons be issued in good
faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution. 400
U. S., at 536. Neither of those conditions is successfully cha ll enged
here.
8
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proscribes state intrusion to extract self-condemnation.
Historically, the privilege sprang from an abhorrence of
governmental assault against the single individual accused of crime and the temptation on the part of the
State to resort to the expedient of compelling incriminating evidence from one's own mouth. United States
v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 698 ( 1944). The Court has
thought the privilege necessary to prevent any "recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even
if not in their stark brutality," Ullman v. United States,
350 U. S. 422, 428 (1956).
In Murphy v. ·waterfront Commission, 378 U. S. 52,
55 (1964), the Court articulated the policies and purposes
of the privilege:
" . . . our unwillingness to subject those suspected
of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an
accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of
criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating
statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment
and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates
'a fair state-individual balance by requiring the
government ... in its contest with the individual
to shoulder the entire load,' . . . our respect for
the inviolability of the human personality and of
the right of each individual 'to a private enclave
"·here he may lead a private life,' ... "

It is important to reiterate that the Fifth Amendment
privilege is a personal privilege: it adheres basically
to the person. not to information which rnay incriminate him. As Mr. Justice Holmes put it: "A party
is privileged from producing the evidence but not from
its production." Johnson Y. United States, 228 U. S.
457, 458 ( 1913). The Constitution explicitly prohibits
compelling an accused to bear "·itness "against himself":

~
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it necessarily did not proscribe incriminating statements elicited from another. Compulsion upon the
person asserting it is an important element of the privilege, and "prohibition of compelling a man ... to be
witn ess against himself is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication
from him," Holt Y. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 252- 253
( 1910) (emphasis added). It is extortion of information from the accused himself that offends our sense /
of justice.
._____
In the case before us the ingredient of persona.I compulsion against an accused is lacking. The summons
and the order of the District Court enforcing it are
directed against the accountant." He. not the taxpayer, is the only one compelled to do anything. And
the accountant makes no claim that he may tend
to be incriminated by the production. Inquisitorial
pressure or coercion against a potentially accused person ,
compelling her, against her ,Yill, to utter self-condemning
·words or produce incriminating documents is absent.
In the present case, no "shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by the accused"
is involved. Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757.
765 ( 1966).
The divulgence of potentially incriminating evidence
against petitioner is naturally umYelcomed. But petitioner's distress ,rnuld be no less if the divulgence came
0 T echnica lly t he order to produ re the records ,ms directed to
petitioner's attornc~· sinre. :ifter the summons was ~erYcd upon the
account ant , he ignored it nncl surrendered t he records to the :1ttorney .
But constitutional rights obvious]~· cannot be enlarged b? this kind
of act ion. The rights and obligat ions of the parties became fixed
\\·hen the summons wa s sen·ed, and the transfer did not alter them.
See United Stat es Y. Zakutansky, 401 F. 2d 68, 72 (CA7 1968) , cert.
denied, 393 U . S. 1021 ; United States Y. L yons, 442 F. 2d 1144 (CAI
1971).
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not from her accountant but from some other third
party with whom she ,rns connected and who possessed
substantially equivalent knowledge of her busin ess affairs.
The basic complaint of petitioner stems from the fact
of divulgence of the possibly incriminating information,
not from the manner in which or the person from " ·horn
it was extracted. Yet such divulgence, where it did not
coerce the accused herself, is a necessary part of the
process of law enforcement and tax investigation .

III
Petitioner's reliance on Boyd v. United States, 116
U. S. 616 (1886) , is misplaced. In Boyd, the person
asserting the privilege was in possession of th e lvritten
statements in question. The Court in Boyd did hold
that "any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's
own testimony or of his private papers to be used as
evidence to convict him of crime," violated the F ourth
and Fifth Amendments. 116 U . S. 630. That case
did not, however, address or contemplate the divergence
of ownership and possession,"° and petitioner concedes
that court decisions applying Boyd have largely been
in instances where possession and ownership conjoined,11
see, e. g. , Hill v. Philpott, 445 F. 2d 144 (CA7 1971);
U. S. v. Judson, 63-2 USTC 9658 (CA9 1963). 12 In
10 A lat er Court commenting on the Boyd privilege noted that
"the papers and effects which the privilege prot ects must be the
privat e property of t he person claiming the privilege or at least in
his possession in a purely personal capacity ." United Stat es v.
Whit e, 322 U. S. 694 , 699 (1944). (Emphasis added.)
11 P etitioner's Brief, pp . 13-14.
1 2 See also United States v. Cohen, 388 F. 2d 464, 468 (CA9 1967) ,
where the court , in upholding the right of a possessor, nonmvner to
assert the privilege, noted t hat "it is possession of papers sought by
the government, not ownership , which set s the stage for exercise of the
governmental compulsion which it is the purpose of the privilege
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Boyd, the production order ·was directed against the
owner of the property ,vho, by responding, would have
been forced "to produce and authenticate any personal
documents or effects that might incriminate him."·
United States Y. lVhite, supra., at 698. But again we
reiterate that in the instant case there was no enforced
communication of any kind from any accused or potential accused.
Petitioner would, in effect, have us read Boyd to·
mark ownership, not possession, as the bounds of the
privilege, 1 3 despite the fact that possession bears the
closest relationship to the personal compulsion forbidden
by the Fifth Amendment. To tie the privilege against
self-incrimination to a concept of ownership ·would be
to draw a meaningless line. It would hold here that
the business records which petitioner actually mvned
would be protected in the hands of her accountant, while,
business information communicated to her accountant
by letter, conversations in which the accountant took
notes, in addition to the accountant's own workpapers
and photocopies of petitioner's records, would not be
subject to a claim of privilege since title rested in the
accountant. Such a holding would thus place unnecessary emphasis on the form of communication to a.n
accountant and the accountant's own working methods,.
while diverting the inquiry from the basic purposes
of the Fifth Amendment's protections.
Other precedents debated by the parties lend no support to petitioner's contention that mvnership of docuto prohibit." Though the instant case concerns the scope of the
privilege for an owner, nonpossessor, the Ninth Circuit's linkage of
possession to the purposes served by the privilege was appropriate.
We do not, of course, decide what qualifies as rightful possession.
enabling the possessor to assert the privilege.
13 Petitioner's Brief, pp. 11-17.
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ments should determine the nvailability of the privilege. 1 •
In Perlman v. United States, 247 U. S. 7 (HHS), the
Court held the privilege unavailable to a party seeking
to suppress the admission of incriminating documents
and exhibits before a grand jury. The movant's expectations of privacy in the exhibits had, according to the
Court. been destroyed when he voluntarily surrendered
the exhibits as evidence in a patent infringement case
he had earlier brought in Federal District Court. Peti14 Biirdeau v. Mc.Dowell, 256 U. S. 465 (1921), also debrrtccl and
citrd in the briefs. held that the gO\·ernrnent may retain for use
again,;t their ownrr in a crimina l proreeding inrrimin[t!ing document ~ \\·hich \\·ere stolen b~· priYate individuals. without an~· go,·ernm enta l knowledge or romplicit,·. nnd turned oYer to the go,·ernm ent. The Court, in clen~·ing the mrner's priYilrge. alludrcl primarily
to the absence of any go,·ernmental compulsion against thr accused,
thr precise facto r ronsiclered in the instant cilsr. It i~ true, as
petitioners argue, that tlw ra~e turns somrwhat on il di~russion of
governm enta l verrns prin1te compulsion and in,:a,ion, hut it is
equally true that the Comt in B11rdcm.1. failrd to find '1n~· impermissible publi c compulsion on the mrner in his absrnee of possession:
" 'Ve know of no C"onstitntional principlr whirh requires the GoYrrnment to surrender the paprrs under surh circumstances. Had it
learned that such incriminator~· paper,. tending to sho"· :-i Yiolation
of federal law. werf' in thr hand, of a prrson other thcln 1hr accused ,
it h:wing had no part in \\·rongfnll~· obtclining thrm. we kno\\· of
no rrason wh? a snbpoem might not isi'ue for the production of the
p:tpers a, eYiden re . Such production would require no unreasonable
sra rch and seizure, nor would it amount to compelling the arrused
to trstif~- against himself." 256 U. S., at 476.
In Johnson v. United States, supra., the Court held that the books
and records of a bankrupt tran~frrred to a tru~tec in bankruptry
could be u~ed as e1·idenre ngn in,t 1he bclnkrupt in n prm:ecution for
ronrcaling monc~· from the truster. Unlike the instant rase, both
title :-ind possess ion pas,ed in that 1r:rn,frr :rnd the record~ werr, in
one sense, "published" br it. But the Court. in denying the p1wilege. recognized that the transfer also succeeded in remoYing the
important element of per,011:11 compul.•icn against the arrused, 228
U. S. 4.59, just as, in thi~ rnse, the nature of the diYestmcnt of possession did.
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tioner's claims of ownership failed to overcome this
fact. The Court noted pertinently:
"But Perlman insists that he owned the exhibits and appears to contend that his ownership
exempted them from any use by the Government
"·ithout his consent. The extent of the insistence
is rather elusive of measurement. It seems to be
that the O\rner of property must be considered as
having a constructive possession of it "·herever it
be and in \Yhosesoever hands it be, and it is always.
therefore, in a kind of asylum of constitutional
privilege. And to be of avail the contention must
be pushed to this extreme. It is opposed , however,
by all the cited cases. They, as we have said, make
the criterion of immunity not the ownership of
property but the 'physical or moral compulsion '
exerted ." 247 U. S. 15.
Petitioner argues. nevertheless, that grave prejudice
" ·ill result from a denial of her claim to equate o,rnership and the scope of the privilege. She alleges that "if
the IRS is abl e to reach her records the instant those
records leave her hands and are deposited in the hands
of her retainer "·horn she has hired for a specia1 purpose then the meaning of the privilege is lost. " 1 5 That
is not , however, the import of today's decision. We
do indeed believe that actual possession of documents
bears the most significant relationship to Fifth Amendment protections against state compulsions upon the
Id. , p. 13. At oral argument petitioner r.1 ised a similar concern:
"The Go\·ernment goe:=: so fo r to contend, I belie,·e, with theirtheor:,: that nny time it i,: out of :r nur actual ph~·sica l possession ,
it is subject to subpoenn . . . . If I " ·ere helping yon across Constitution Annue b:, cnrr~·ing ~-our briefcase, the Government holds
that the~· could hnncl me a 5ummons in the middle of Constitution
A\·enuc nncl seize ~-our documents to use agninst you in a criminal
trial." Tr. of Oral Arg. , p. 14.
1"
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individual accused of crime. Yet situations ma.y well
arise where the relinquishment of possession is so temporary and insignificant as to leave the personal compulsions upon the accused substantially intact. 1 G But
this is not the case before us. Here there was no mere
fleeting divestment of possession: the records had been
given to this accountant regularly since 1955 and remained in his continuous possession until the summer
of 1968 when the summons was issued.]7 :Moreover,
the accountant himself ,vorked neither in petitioner's
office nor as his employee. 18 The length of his possession
16 Schwimmer v. United States. 232 F. 2d 855 (CAS 1956) , inYoh·ed
an attorne,·'s partiall~· successful motion to quash two subpoenas
duces teciim issued in a grand jmy proceeding against a corporation
where the attorney had stored hi~ office files. United States v.
Guterma, 272 F. 2d 344 (CA2 1959), concerned the storage of taxpayer's personal records in a safe in offices of a corporation which
the taxpayer had served as Chairman of the Board. Only the taxpayer and an indicted co-defendant knew the combination of the
safe. and the corporat ion had no access to it . The Court of Appeals
upheld the taxpayer's assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege as to
his personal records in the face of a grand jury subpoena directed
to the corporation.
Petitioner argues these cases support his position (Brief, pp. 1415) ; the Government argues the~· can be distinguished from the
instant case as involving mere custodial safekeeping of records, not
disclosure of their information to a third person (Brief, p. 21). We
refrain from judging the merits of such distinctions today.
17 Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 31.
18 As we noted, supra, p. - , his status is that of an independent
contractor. He actually did "very litt le work for the petitioner,"
had many other clients, and was compensated by the job. Tr. of
Oral Arg., p. 8.
This is a signifi cant point. The Government noted in oral
argument:

"In the Internal Revenue SerYice practice, so long as tho taxpayer
has retained possession of the records and they are being used only
by his full-time employees or others on the taxpayer's premises, without the taxpayer having relinquished possession or control of the
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records and his independent status conthat petitioner's divestment of possession
character as to disqualify her entirely as
any impermissible Fifth Amendment
IV

Petitioner further argues that the confidential nature
of the accountant-client relationship and her resulting
expectation of privacy in delivering the records protect
her, under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, from
their production . Although not in itself controlling. we
note that no confidential accountant-client privilege
exists under federal law, and no State-created privilege
has been recognized in federal cases, Falsone v. United
Stcdes, 205 F. 2d 734 (CA5 1953), cert. denied, 346
U. S. 864; Gariepy v. United States, 189 F. 2d 459,
463-464 (CA6 1951); Himmelfarb v. United States,
175 F. 2d 924, 939 ( CA9 1949) , cert. denied, 338
U. S. 860; Olender v. United States, 210 F . 2d 795, 806
(CA9 1954). Nor is there justification for such a privilege where records relevant to income tax returns are
involved in a criminal investigation or prosecution. In
Boyd, a pre-income tax case, the Court spoke of protection of privacy, 116 U. S., at 630, but there can be little
expectation of privacy where records are handed to an
accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much
of the information therein is required in an income tax
return. What information is not disclosed is largely
in the accountant's discretion, not petitioner's. Indeed,
the accountant himself risks criminal prosecution if he
records, we ordinarily in those situations issue the summons to the
taxpayer, because it is the taxpayer who has the dominion over the
records and the authority to return the summons. And if the taxpayer chooses to plead the priYilegc against self-incrimination, that
is up to the taxpayer." Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 30.

'

.
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knowingly assists in the preparation of a false return.
26 U. S. C. § 7602 (2). His own need for self-protection
would often require the right to disclose the information given him. Petitioner seeks extensions of constitutional protections against self-incrimination in the
very situation where obligations of disclosure exist and
under a system largely dependent upon honest selfreporting even to survive. Accordingly, petitioner here
cannot reasonably claim, either for Fourth 19 or Fifth
Amendment purposes, an expectation of protected privacy or confidentiality.
V
The criterion for Fifth Amendment immunity remains
not the o;vnership of property, but the "physical or
moral compulsion exerted." Perlman, supra, at 15. ,Ve
hold today that no Fourth or Fifth Amendment claim can
prevail where, as in this case, there exists no legitimate
expectation of privacy and no semblance of governmental compulsion against the person of the accused.
It is important, in applying constitutional principles,
to interpret them in light of the fundamental interests
of personal liberty they were meant to serve. Respect
for these principles is eroded when they leap their
proper bounds to interfere with the legitimate interest
of society in enforcement of its laws and collection of
the revenues.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

1 9 See 11. 6, supra.
The summons satisfied the requirements in
United States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48, 57-58 (1964), and, as explained above, the necessary expectation of privacy to launch a valid
Fourth Amendment rlajm docs not exist . Katz v. United States, 389
U. S. 347 (1967).

